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NEITHER ‘TWIXT NOR ‘TWEEN: 
EMERGING PROPERTY INTERESTS IN 
BANKRUPTCY 
Lawrence Ponoroff* 
A core policy underlying the federal bankruptcy system is to draw a hard line 
between the debtor’s pre- and postfiling lives. This serves both to further the 
debtor’s fresh start and assure a final accounting and settlement of all prepetition 
claims against the debtor. For this reason, a consensus has developed in the 
decisional law that the term “claim,” for purposes of determining participation in 
a bankruptcy case, is defined more expansively than under state-law rubrics. Until 
recently, most cases have adopted a similarly expansive approach to defining 
property of the estate in the case of debtor causes of action that evolve over time 
and, thus, are tied to events occurring both pre- and postfiling. This advances the 
creditor equality aims of the system by ensuring that claims defined as arising 
prepetition (and thus subject to discharge) will share in the property interests of the 
debtor corresponding defined. Recently, however, some courts have begun to 
analyze property interests that straddle the filing by tying the question to state-law 
accrual rules. This Article takes the position that those authorities are misguided, 
misunderstand the division of authority between state and federal law in bankruptcy 
cases, and have unnecessarily complicated the analysis of assignment of debtor 
causes of action to the property of the estate. It concludes by urging that 
characterization of these claims be resolved under a federal framework and with 
specific attention to the unique aims of the bankruptcy system. 
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the foundational policy objectives of the Bankruptcy Reform Act 
of 19781 was to provide the most comprehensive relief possible for both debtors and 
creditors.2 Attainment of this goal requires that entry of the order for relief in a 
bankruptcy case3 operate to hew a distinct and largely impenetrable barrier between 
the debtor’s pre- and postbankruptcy lives.4 
                                                                                                                
 1. The current law of bankruptcy is found in Title 11 of the United States Code. 
11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 (2016), amended by Pub. L. No. 114-254, CONGRESS.GOV (Dec. 10, 
2016), https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/2028/all-info. It was enacted 
on November 6, 1978, as the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 
2549, (the “1978 Act”), and governs all cases filed on or after October 1, 1979. In the text of 
this Article, except where otherwise indicated, all references herein to the “Code” or the 
“Bankruptcy Code” are to Title 11 of the United States Code as amended through December 
10, 2016. 
 2. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, ch. 3, at 180 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6141 (emphasis added) (“The proposed law will permit a complete 
settlement of the affairs of a bankruptcy debtor . . . .”); Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 55 
(1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (referring to the foregoing statement on the legislative history 
in urging a broad definition of the term “debt” for purposes of the discharge); see also infra 
note 41. 
 3. Pursuant to Code § 301(b), the filing of a petition under any chapter of the 
Code automatically constitutes the order for relief under such chapter. In an involuntary case, 
the order for relief is not entered automatically upon filing. Rather, relief is only ordered upon 
the granting of the involuntary petition. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(h). Involuntary filings are, by 
far, the exception rather than the rule. In 2012, for example, according to statistics maintained 
by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, involuntary filings represented less 
than one half of one percent of all bankruptcy filings for the year. See UNITED STATES COURTS, 
U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURTS―VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY CASES FILED,  
BY CHAPTER OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE (2012), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/statistics_import_dir/Table702_6.pdf.  
 4. See, e.g., Laura B. Bartell, Straddle Obligations Under Prepetition Contracts: 
Prepetition Claims, Postpetition Claims or Administrative Expenses?, 25 EMORY BANKR. 
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To illustrate this point, consider the following simple but instructive 
hypothetical. Assume Sally files for relief under Chapter 7 at 10:30 a.m. on May 15, 
2018. On the way to the courthouse to lodge her petition, Sally negligently clips a 
pedestrian, Barry, with her car, causing Barry grievous bodily injury. After having 
filed her petition—and thus commencing her case—Sally, while driving home, 
manages to strike another pedestrian, Stanley, at about 11:30 a.m., causing him 
injuries similar to those suffered by Barry just about an hour earlier.5 
In Sally’s bankruptcy case, Barry will have a “claim,”6 simultaneously 
entitling him to his pro rata share of the distribution, if any, made to unsecured 
creditors7 and resulting in the discharge of the unsatisfied portion of the liability 
arising from his personal-injury claim.8 Stanley, whose tort claim arose after the 
filing of the case, will not be entitled to participate in distributions from the estate 
                                                                                                                
DEV. J. 39, 39 (2008) (“The Bankruptcy Code divides the universe of claims into two basic 
categories—those that arise at or before the order for relief concerning the debtor, and those 
that do not-and treats each class very differently.”); see also Porrett v. Hillen (In re Porrett), 
564 B.R. 57, 66 (D. Idaho 2016) (“[C]ommencement of the case ‘sets a date of cleavage and 
establishes the moment at which the parties’ respective rights in property must be 
determined.’” (citations omitted)); In re Sturgis Iron & Metal Co., 420 B.R. 716, 749 n.63 
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2009) (“[T]he entire bankruptcy process is based upon a division in 
[t]ime, [sic] with claims that arose prepetition against the debtor being treated in one manner 
and claims that arose against the estate post-petition being treated in a different manner.”); 
Siegel v. Fed. Dep. Ins. Corp (In re Indymac Bancorp), Inc., 2012 WL 1037481 *12 (Bankr. 
C.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2012) (noting that the phrase “as of the commencement of the case” in 
§ 541(a)(1) is intended to set a date of cleavage for establishing the parties’ respective rights 
in property). The importance of the date of filing as establishing a date of cleavage between 
the debtor’s pre- and postpetition lives has deep roots in bankruptcy jurisprudence. See James 
Angell McLaughlin, Amendment of the Bankruptcy Act, 40 HARV. L. REV. 583, 604 (1927) 
(“It is essential to working out a practicable theory of bankruptcy administration that some 
day be fixed as of which adjustments shall be made. All the assets in existence on a certain 
day ought to be applied toward the liquidation of all the liabilities on that day insofar as 
possible.”). 
 5. The date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition also serves as the date of 
cleavage in a Chapter 11 case. See Ashland Petroleum Co. v. Appel (In re B & L Oil Co.), 
782 F.2d 155, 158 (10th Cir. 1986) (“Once a petition is filed, debts that arose before the 
petition may not be satisfied through post-petition transactions.”). 
 6. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (defining a “claim” as “a right to payment, whether 
or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, 
unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured or unsecured . . . .”). 
 7. Nonpriority, unsecured claimholders are paid pari passu under Code 
§ 726(a)(2) and ahead of claims falling into subsection (a)(3) and (a)(4), and ahead of the 
debtor, who takes after satisfaction of all allowed claims and legal interest thereon. 11 U.S.C. 
§ 725(a)(5), (6). 
 8. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (limiting the scope of the discharge to “debts that arose 
before the date of relief of the order of relief). Chapters 11 and 13 have comparable provisions 
regarding individual debtors. See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1) (debts arising prior to confirmation 
subject to discharge); and § 1328(a) (upon plan completion all debts provided for in the plan 
are discharged). 
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but will be able to pursue his claim against Sally free from the bankruptcy 
discharge.9 
In most Chapter 7 cases, Stanley will fare better than Barry in the long-
run.10 That being true, there is no additional reason to kick Barry while he is already 
down. Stated in other words, it would be manifestly inequitable, on the one hand, to 
limit Barry (and other prepetition creditors) to his ratable share of the net assets (if 
any) of the bankruptcy estate without, on the other hand, including within that estate 
all of Sally’s assets that existed as of the commencement of the case;11 hence, the 
Code’s far-reaching approach to defining property of the estate.12 The primary 
inclusive provision is § 541(a)(1), which defines the estate as “all legal or equitable 
interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.”13 The 
Supreme Court has routinely found that, to fulfill the purposes of bankruptcy law, 
the definition of property of the debtor’s estate must be broadly interpreted to 
include all legally cognizable interests extant as of the time of filing, even if 
contingent or not subject to possession until a future time.14 
So far so good. The breakdown incongruity, however, occurs with respect 
to the categorization of claims and property interests that reside partly in a debtor’s 
prepetition life and partly in his or her postpetition life. With respect to such claims, 
                                                                                                                
 9. In addition, the automatic stay in § 362 of the Code does not apply to actions 
against the debtor or the debtor’s property based on claims that arose after the commencement 
of the case. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a)(1)–(8) (each subsection referring, in one manner 
or another, to claims arising before the commencement of the bankruptcy case). 
 10. In fact, most Chapter 7 cases are “no-asset” cases in which there are no 
distributions to unsecured creditors. Lois I. Lupica, The Consumer Bankruptcy Fee Study; 
Final Report, 20 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 17, 53 (2012) (highlighting that of the 7,350 
Chapter 7 cases forming the sample for the author’s national study, 6,603 (or about 90%) 
were no-asset cases). Even in those cases where there are distributable assets, the “full-pay” 
Chapter 7 case is rare indeed. The situation is a little different in Chapter 11 where, depending 
on the terms of the plan, it may be in a creditor’s interest to have his or her claim classified 
as prepetition. For instance, in Epstein v. Off. Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Estate of 
Piper Aircraft (In re Estate of Piper Aircraft), 58 F.3d 1573, 1576 (11th Cir. 1995), the 
representative appointed on behalf of unknown future claimants attempted to argue, 
ultimately unsuccessfully, that future claimants held claims within the meaning of § 105(a) 
of the Code. Id. at 1571. 
 11. See, e.g., In re Meyers, 139 B.R. 858, 861 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992) (“The 
debtors’ position [that their lottery winnings were not part of the bankruptcy estate] . . . 
boggles the mind from a policy perspective, and certainly offends the spirit of bankruptcy 
law. These debtors would wish to enjoy their windfall uninhibited by previously established 
debts.”). 
 12. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 367 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5963, 6323 (“The scope of this paragraph [§ 541(a)(1)] is broad. It includes all kinds of 
property, including tangible and intangible causes of action (see Bankruptcy Act Sec. 
70A(6)), and all forms of property currently specified in Section 70A of the Bankruptcy Act 
. . . .”). See authorities cited infra note 44. 
 13. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2016). More broadly speaking, property of the 
bankruptcy estate includes the nine nonexclusive subcategories of property detailed in 
subsection (a)(1) through (a)(9) of 11 U.S.C. § 541. Id. at § 541(a)(1)–(9). 
 14. See, e.g., United States v. Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. 198, 204–05 (1983). 
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the uncertainty in the case law over the standard governing when a claim against the 
debtor (and, ergo, the estate) arises has largely dissipated since 2010 in favor of an 
expansive definition of “claim” driven by the object in bankruptcy of achieving a 
final resolution of all prefiling assets and liabilities of the debtor.15 Inexplicably, at 
the same time, the broad consensus that—up until about 2015—had existed with 
respect to assigning particular property interests as property of the estate vel non has 
deteriorated.16 This raises the disquieting possibility that a prepetition claimholder 
against the estate, as determined under the prevailing broad interpretation of that 
status, will receive no benefit from property of the debtor that, under a comparable 
interpretation, would have belonged to the bankruptcy estate and, thus, have been 
available to apply to prepetition claims. 
The dissonance derives from a conceptual disparity over the relative role 
of state and federal law in the making of these determinations. In turn, in a very real 
sense, it is a microcosmic reflection of the unhealthy ambiguity surrounding the 
division of authority between state and federal law in bankruptcy more generally.17 
The discordance is readily apparent from the Fifth Circuit’s decision in In re 
Cantu,18 wherein the court determined that the “line of cases assessing whether a 
tort claim asserted against the debtor is a dischargeable one that arose prepetition is 
quite different from the situation we face concerning the timing of a claim asserted 
by the debtor.”19 Thus, instead of employing—as urged by the trustee—the 
consensus test that had emerged for defining when a claim against the debtor 
arises,20 the court adopted what it dubbed the “accrual approach” for deciding 
whether a claim owned by the debtor becomes property of the estate.21 
Under this approach, according to the court, a claim by the debtor will not 
be deemed to arise for purposes of § 541(a) until a cause of action has “accrued” 
under state law.22 The court continued that “[t]he accrual of a cause of action means 
the right to institute and maintain a suit, and whenever one person may sue another 
a cause of action has accrued.”23 As a general proposition, accrual under state law 
(including under Texas law per the court in Cantu) will turn on whether the wrongful 
                                                                                                                
 15. The most recent circuit to adopt this approach was the Third Circuit in Jeld-
Wen v. Van Brunt (In re Grossman’s, Inc.), 607 F.3d 114, 125 (3d Cir. 2010). For further 
discussion see infra notes 35–42 and accompanying text. 
 16. See infra Section III.B. 
 17. See generally Lawrence Ponoroff, Whither Recharacterization, 68 RUTGERS 
U. L. REV. 1217, 1262 (2016) (discussing the relative role of state and federal law in relation 
to the existence and treatment of a claim in a bankruptcy case). 
 18. Cantu v. Schmidt (In re Cantu), 784 F.3d 253 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 19. Id. at 259. 
 20. See infra notes 39–42 and accompanying text. 
 21. Cantu, 784 F.3d at 257. 
 22. Cantu, 784 F.3d at 260. Ironically, the accrual approach as applied to claims 
against the estate was widely criticized and eventually rejected by the only circuit to follow 
that approach. See sources cited infra note 39. 
 23. Cantu, 784 F.3d at 260 (citing State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Swift (In re Swift), 
129 F.3d 792, 795 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Luling Oil & Gas Co. v. Humble Oil & Refining 
Co., 191 S.W.2d 716, 721 (1946))). 
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conduct at issue has caused a “legal injury.”24 Therefore, in order for the claim to be 
classified as property of the estate, facts must have come into existence before the 
filing of the bankruptcy petition authorizing the debtor to seek a legal remedy.25 
In effect, then, Cantu requires that each of the essential elements of the 
cause must have occurred or been satisfied before commencement of the bankruptcy 
case. Notably, however, the court continued that accrual may occur “even if the fact 
of the injury is not discovered until later, and even if all resulting damages have not 
yet occurred.”26 In so doing, the court introduced the distinction between an “accrual 
rule,” tied to the occurrence of some form of injury, and a “discovery rule,” requiring 
knowledge or reason to know of the injury.27 Due to imprecise analysis and use of 
language, this distinction has maddeningly confused the analysis in cases where the 
two do not coincide.28 
In eliciting this contrast between claims against versus claims by the 
debtor, the court drew on the reasoning of a 1996 bankruptcy-court decision from 
the Western District of Texas.29 In that opinion, the court rationalized the divergent 
treatment on the basis that neither the fresh-start policy nor the due-process 
considerations that underlie the decisions focused on when a claim has arisen against 
the estate “translate” to the situation where the question posed involves whether a 
cause of action by the debtor belongs to the estate.30 The observation is undoubtedly 
true, but as a principled rationale for drawing a distinction between the scope of 
creditor claims and property interests of the debtor, it is woefully inadequate. 
Specifically, it differentiates but does not really explain why the difference matters; 
it offers no affirmative justification for why the standard should be less inclusive in 
circumstances where the issue is whether a property interest is captured in the 
bankruptcy estate. This is particularly troubling given the potential that employment 
                                                                                                                
 24. Cantu, 784 F.3d at 258. 
 25. Id. at 260. In reaching this decision, the court attempted to “clarify” its earlier 
holding in Wheeler v. Magdovitz (In re Wheeler), 137 F.3d 299 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam), 
in which the cause analyzed the question of when a debtor cause of action arose under both 
the accrual approach and the test developed by the Court in Lemelle v. Universal Mfg. Corp., 
18 F.3d 1268 (5th Cir. 1994) for determining when a claim against the estate would be deemed 
to arise. Id. at 258–59. The court noted that Wheeler’s use of the “prepetition relationship” 
test set forth in Lemelle was at odds with the court’s earlier decision in State Farm Life Ins. 
Co. v. Swift (In re Swift), 129 F.3d 792 (5th Cir. 1997), holding that some form of legal injury 
must occur before a cause of action accrues under state law. Id. at 259–60. Referencing the 
“rule of orderliness,” the court concluded that the conflict would be resolved in favor of the 
earlier decision. Id. 
 26. Id. at 260 (emphasis added) (further citations omitted) (citing Murphy v. 
Campbell, 964 S.W.2d 265, 270 (Tex. 1997)). 
 27. See, e.g., In re Wagner, 530 B.R. 695 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2015), discussed infra 
text accompanying notes 195–211. 
 28. See infra Section II.B. 
 29. Swift v. Seidler (In re Swift), 198 B.R. 927, 935–56 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1996) 
(a companion case to State Farm that failed to even mention the primary Supreme Court 
authority on the issue, Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375 (1966)); see infra text accompanying 
notes 74–78. 
 30. Cantu, 784 F.3d at 259. 
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of this less inclusive standard creates for prejudicing prepetition claimholders and, 
thereby, upsetting the distributional scheme contemplated by the Code.31 
While it is possible to read Cantu narrowly—based on the distinction 
between “accrual” and “discovery”—so as not to entirely cede an important issue of 
bankruptcy law to the vagaries of state-law statute-of-limitations doctrine,32 in 
fairness, it is not the most plausible interpretation of the holding even if that is what 
was intended by the panel.33 In either case, Cantu is wrong on the law and just plain 
bad policy. 
For this reason, this Article espouses the view that the judgment concerning 
when a debtor’s cause of action against a third party belongs to the bankruptcy estate 
should be made under a federal standard that comports with the widely accepted 
federal approach used to determine the existence of a claim against the estate.34 In 
supporting this position, Part I of this Article establishes the basic case favoring the 
use of a complementary standard for assessing when claims by and against the estate 
should be regarded to exist for bankruptcy purposes. Part II focuses on the special 
issue of, as existed in Cantu, claims that do not neatly fall into either the debtor’s 
pre- or postbankruptcy-petition life but have roots in both (hereinafter referred to as 
“straddle claims”). Part III then examines the case law concerning straddle claims, 
emphasizing the growing disagreement and uncertainty among courts in recent 
years. Next, Part IV places this issue in the broader context of the division of 
authority between state and federal law in bankruptcy cases, concluding that federal 
interests predominate when it comes to determining the characterization of straddle 
claims under § 541(a)(1). Finally, Part V sets forth a recommendation regarding the 
standard governing application of the preferred federal rule for deciding if a debtor’s 
cause of action is estate property and then considers under what circumstances that 
rule, though technically applicable, might be suspended in the interests of other 
policy aims. 
                                                                                                                
 31. Excluding assets from the estate as postpetition operates to the benefit of the 
debtor or postpetition creditors. In either case, it is contrary to key bankruptcy policy 
considerations. The fresh start is not intended to be a head start, and advantaging postpetition 
creditors at the expense of their prepetition counterparts runs counter to bankruptcy-equality 
policy as discussed infra notes 54, 258, 266, and 356–58 and accompanying text. 
 32. See State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Swift (In re Swift), 129 F.3d 792, 795–97 (5th 
Cir. 1997) (describing the distinction between accrual of a cause of action and commencement 
of the running of the statute of limitations based on “discovery” of the existence of the claim); 
see also infra text accompanying notes 179–80 and 244. For a cogent explanation of why the 
focus on “accrual” and “discovery” of a cause of action, and the effect those might have on 
the running of the statute of limitations, is a “distraction” insofar as resolution of the 
underlying issue of what constitutes property of the estate is concerned, see In re Carroll, 586 
B.R. 775, 788–89 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2018). 
 33. Of course, it is a little unclear exactly what the court intended, other than a 
much greater deference to state-law rules addressing ripeness than had been contemplated by 
the overwhelming weight of authority at the time addressing the question of the standard to 
be applied in determining when straddle claims are included in the estate. 
 34. See infra notes 37–42 and accompanying text. 
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I. THE COMPLEMENTARITY OF “CLAIMS” AND “PROPERTY OF THE 
ESTATE” 
As already observed, with the intention of maximizing the scope of relief 
available in a bankruptcy case, the legislative history of the Code makes crystal clear 
that what constitutes a “claim” under the definition in § 101(5)—affecting both who 
is entitled to participate in distributions from a bankruptcy estate and what is subject 
to discharge—is to be given an expansive definition.35 There is also no question that 
the determination of when a claim arises occurs under federal, not state, law.36 In 
other words, a claim may, and often does, arise for bankruptcy purposes well before 
a cause of action based on the same facts accrues under state law.37 
The only circuit to have followed the approach that a claim does not arise 
for bankruptcy purposes until it actually accrues under state law38 was roundly (and 
appropriately) criticized for taking this position.39 Eventually, that court reversed 
field on the point in 2010,40 adopting what has come to be known as the prepetition-
relationship test, under which a claim is deemed to arise for purposes of § 101(5) 
once there is some relationship, such as conduct, exposure, impact, or privity, prior 
to the commencement of the bankruptcy case.41 Pursuant to this standard, a party 
                                                                                                                
 35. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 309 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 
6266 (“[T]he bill contemplates that all legal obligations of the debtor, no matter how remote 
or contingent, will be dealt with in the bankruptcy case.”). 
 36. E.g., In re Wilbur, 237 B.R. 203, 209 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999) (“Federal, not 
state law, controls the issue of when a claim arises for the purposes of bankruptcy.”); In re 
Nat’l Gypsum Co., 139 B.R. 397, 405 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992) (“While non-bankruptcy law 
governs the existence of a claim under the Code, it is not dispositive of the time at which a 
claim arises under the Code.” (emphasis in original)). 
 37. See, e.g., In re Solitron Devices, Inc., 510 B.R. 890, 895 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 
2014) (“A creditor need not have a cause of action that can be pursued under non-bankruptcy 
law to hold a claim under the Bankruptcy Code.”). 
 38. See Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co. (In re M. Frenville Co.), 744 F.2d 
332, 337 (3d Cir. 1984) (en banc). 
 39. See, e.g., Cadleway Props., Inc. v. Andrews (In re Andrews), 239 F.3d 708, 
710 n. 7 (5th Cir. 2001) (describing Frenville as universally rejected); In re Yanks, 49 B.R. 
56, 58 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985) (noting that Frenville ignores fundamental bankruptcy 
policies); Ralph R. Mabey & Annette W. Jarvis, In re Frenville: A Critique by the National 
Bankruptcy Conference’s Committee of Claims and Distributions, 42 BUS. LAW. 697 (1987). 
 40. See Jeld-Wen v. Van Brunt (In re Grossman’s, Inc.), 607 F.3d 114, 125 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (holding that the claimant’s exposure to a product, if it occurs prepetition, gives 
rise to claim under § 101(5) even though the injury resulting from such exposure is not 
manifested until after the bankruptcy filing). 
 41. See, e.g., Williams v. Placid Oil Co. (In re Placid Oil), 753 F.3d 151, 159 n.2 
(5th Cir. 2014); Lemelle v. Univ. Mfg. Corp., 18 F.3d 1268, 1277 (5th Cir. 1994); Ritter 
Ranch Dev., LLC v. City of Palmdale (In re Ritter Ranch Dev., LLC), 255 B.R. 760, 765 
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2000) (noting that the Ninth Circuit follows the prepetition-relationship test); 
In re Chateaugay, 102 B.R. 335, 350 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“The legislative history to 
§ 101(4) [now 101(5)] demonstrates that the term ‘claim’ is intended by this definition to be 
as broadly interpreted as possible so that maximum relief can be afforded to a debtor.”). The 
Eleventh Circuit has adopted an even broader version of the prepetition-relationship test in 
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that is, for example, exposed prepetition to a defective or dangerous product (or 
perhaps a harmful environmental emission) has a claim, even though no actual injury 
has yet occurred. A party would also have a claim if it suffered a prepetition injury 
but did not know, or have reason to know, of the existence of the claim until after 
the filing of the petition.42 
Similarly, the “property of the estate” for purposes of § 541(a) consists of 
“every conceivable interest of the debtor, future, nonpossessory, contingent, 
speculative, and derivative, . . . [including] causes of action owned by the debtor or 
arising from property of the estate.”43 Courts have consistently held that the scope 
                                                                                                                
Chapter 11 cases by extending its application to claims arising prior to the debtor’s 
confirmation of a plan of reorganization. Epstein v. Off. Comm. Of Unsecured Creditors of 
Piper Aircraft Corp. (In re Piper Aircraft Corp), 58 F.3d 1573 (1995). Also, a few older 
decisions follow a “conduct test,” under which a claim arises as soon as the acts giving rise 
to the defendant’s liability were performed. E.g., Grady v. A.H. Robins Co., 839 F.2d 198 
(1988); cf. United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 944 F.2d 997, 1003 (2d Cir. 
1991) (criticizing the conduct test as too broad). 
No matter which test courts use in attempting to determine whether the unknown 
future claimant has a “claim” cognizable in bankruptcy, they generally have little problem 
concluding that those who have entered into a prepetition contract with the debtor (and 
therefore have an opportunity to present their claims in the bankruptcy case) have cognizable 
claims, and that a creditor need not have a cause of action that could be pursued under state 
law. See In re Remington Rand Corp., 836 F.2d 825, 826–27 (3d Cir. 1988); In re Nat’l 
Gypsum Cop., 139 B.R. 397, 405 (N.D. Tex. 1992). 
 42. See In re Future Energy Holdings Corp., 522 B.R. 520, 527 (Bankr. D. Del. 
2015) (claim arises upon exposure to product). One important caveat in relation to the 
prepetition-relationship test is assuring future claimants with constitutionally sufficient 
notice. See Lemelle, 18 F.3d at 1277; infra notes 327–37 and accompanying text. 
 43. See Chartschlaa v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 538 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 
2008); H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 367 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6322–
23. The legislative purpose of this section was to move away from the “complicated mélange 
of references to State law” and to “determine what is property of the estate by a simple 
reference to what interests in property that debtor has at the time of the commencement of the 
case.” Id. at 175 (footnotes omitted); see also Rajala v. Freedom Capital, LLC, 661 Fed. 
Appx. 512, 515 (10th Cir. 2016); Logan v. JKV Real Estate (Servs.) (In re Bogdan), 414 F.3d 
507, 512 (4th Cir. 2005) (noting that causes of action have uniformly been included within 
the definition of property of the estate); Bavely v. United States (In re Terwilliger’s Catering 
Plus, Inc.), 911 F.2d 1168, 1172 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that once the determination of 
property rights is made under state law, federal bankruptcy law dictates to what extent that 
interest is property of the estate for the purposes of § 541); Winick & Rich, P.C. v. Strada 
Design Assocs. (In re Strada Design Assocs.), 326 B.R. 229, 236 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(“Section 541(a) is not restricted by state law concepts such as when a cause of action ripens 
or a statute of limitations begins to run, and ‘property of the estate’ may include claims that 
were inchoate on the petition date.”). 
For authorities specifically regarding the applicability of § 541(a) to a debtor’s causes 
of action or legal claims, see McGuire v. United States, 550 F.3d 903, 914 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(“A chose in action is property of the bankruptcy estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1).”) 
(citing City & County of San Francisco v. PG & E Corp., 433 F.3d 1115, 1126 (9th Cir. 
2006)); Smith v. Arthur Andersen, L.L.P., 421 F.3d 989, 1002 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The ‘property 
of the estate’ includes “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the 
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of § 541 is broad and is to be generously construed44 “and that an interest may be 
property of the estate even if it is novel or contingent.”45 In the words of the leading 
treatise in the field, “[i]t would be hard to imagine language that would be more 
encompassing” than this broad definition.46 This interpretation, again, is consistent 
with the Code’s goal of drawing a bright line of demarcation between the debtor’s 
pre- and postbankruptcy lives so as to settle, “as of the commencement of the case,” 
all of the debtor’s financial affairs—assets and liabilities—to the fullest extent 
possible.47 
There is, therefore, an almost symbiotic relationship between the definition 
of “claim” in § 101(5) and “property of the estate” in § 541(a).48 They are 
coterminous and interrelated to the point that the identical temporal language—“as 
of the commencement of the case”—is used in both provisions. In his influential 
treatise, Professor Tabb expounds on this relationship, speaking of the scope of 
§ 541(a), in the following terms: 
As this expansive statutory language suggests, Congress intended that 
property of the estate have a very broad scope. The encompassing 
reach of the bankruptcy estate mirrors the sweeping definition of 
“claim” in § 101(5). In each instance, Congress operated from the 
baseline premise that, to the extent reasonably possible, the 
                                                                                                                
commencement of the case . . . including the debtor’s ‘causes of action.’”’”) (citing United 
States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 205 n.9 (1983)); Cohen v. Drexel Burnham 
Lambert Group, Inc. (In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc.), 138 B.R. 687, 701 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
 44. See, e.g., Gladstone v. Bancorp, 811 F.3d 1133, 1139 (9th Cir. 2016) (“The 
legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code reveals the concept of property of the estate to be 
interpreted broadly.”) (quoting Chappel v. Proctor (In re Chappel), 189 B.R. 489, 493 (9th 
Cir. BAP 1995)). “This definition is unquestionably broad, and it is well-settled that property 
of the estate includes ‘every conceivable interest of the debtor’ held as of the commencement 
of the bankruptcy case, whether that interest is ‘future, nonpossessory, contingent, speculative 
[or] derivative.’” Moyer v. Slotman (In re Slotman), 2013 WL 7823003, at *5 (Bankr. W.D. 
Mich. 2013) (citing In re Yonikus, 996 F.2d 866, 869 (7th Cir. 1993)); see also Arrowsmith 
v. United States (In re Health Diagnostic Laboratory, Inc.), 578 B.R. 552, 561 (Bankr. E.D. 
Va. 2017) (holding that Congress intended that “property” for purposes of § 541(a) be 
understood as a sweeping term, incorporating both tangible and intangible property). 
Moreover, by virtue of § 541(a)(7), property of the estate also includes any interest in property 
that the estate acquires after the commencement of the case. See, e.g., TMT Procurement 
Corp. v. Vantage Drilling Co. (In re TMT Procurement Corp.), 764 F.3d 512, 523 (5th Cir. 
2014). 
 45. See, e.g., Parks v. Dittmar (In re Dittmar), 618 F.3d 1199, 1207 (10th Cir. 
2010) (citations omitted); Yonkius, 996 F.2d at 869 (“[E]very conceivable interest of the 
debtor, future, nonpossessory, contingent, speculative, and derivative, is within reach of 11 
U.S.C. § 541.”) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 
 46. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 541.01 (Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer eds., 
16th ed.). 
 47. See supra note 4. 
 48. But see Cantu v. Schmidt, 784 F.3d 253, 259–60 (5th Cir. 2015) (rejecting this 
proposition); supra text accompanying notes 18–27. 
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bankruptcy case should settle all of the debtor’s financial affairs 
[assets and liabilities alike] as of the time of the bankruptcy filing.49 
In short, it is essential to realizing the basic policy objectives ingrained in 
the bankruptcy system that the parameters of “property of the estate” and what 
constitutes a “claim against the estate” be given not only the broadest practicable 
definition, but also complementary definitions so that prefiling claims receive their 
pro rata share of prefiling property, similarly defined, before being forever 
discharged.50 
Achieving this goal requires that, just as the question of when a claim arises 
for purposes of participation in a bankruptcy case does not depend on state law,51 
the determination of property of the estate in the context of straddle claims cannot 
be made solely by reference to state law. To do so would be to disregard the balance 
that Congress has struck between the competing interests of debtors and creditors 
under the bankruptcy law.52 Central to accomplishing that balance is the necessity 
of carving a wide chasm between the debtor’s pre- and postpetition lives,53 such that 
in return for the fresh start that the debtor receives in the latter, prepetition creditors 
receive all of the debtor’s property attributable to the former. Put another way, 
claims and property interests belonging to the debtor’s prepetition life must be 
matched in the same fashion that an auditor will match revenues and expenses to the 
particular accounting period to which they relate.54 
                                                                                                                
 49. CHARLES J. TABB, LAW OF BANKRUPTCY § 5.2 p. 389–91 (4th. ed. 2016). 
 50. This assures equity among creditors, a goal central to the accomplishment of 
bankruptcy policy. “[E]quality is equity, and this is the spirit of the bankrupt law.” 
Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1, 13 (1924). 
 51. See supra notes 20, 37–42 and accompanying text. 
 52. Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 785 (1987) (“In 
bankruptcy, with an inadequate pie to divide and the looming discharge of unpaid debts, the 
disputes center on who is entitled to shares of the debtor’s assets and how those shares are to 
be divided. Distribution among creditors is not incidental to other concerns; it is the center of 
the bankruptcy scheme.”); see also Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy 
Entitlements, and the Creditors’ Bargain, 91 YALE L. J. 857, 857 (1982) (noting that while 
bankruptcy is usually thought of as a procedure for providing relief to an overburdened debtor, 
in fact, most of the bankruptcy process is concerned with creditor-distribution questions). 
 53. See David G. Epstein, Casey Ariail & David M. Smith, Not Just Anna Nicole 
Smith: Cleavage in Bankruptcy, 31 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 15, 19–20 (2014) (“Even more 
important than the cleavage effect of a bankruptcy petition on the rights of prepetition and 
postpetition creditors against the debtor is the cleavage effect of a bankruptcy petition on the 
relative rights of creditors.”). 
 54. In the context of determining whether certain transactions represented secured 
loans or leases for purposes of § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, Judge Easterbrook made the 
identical conceptual point about Code policy and methodology: 
Bankruptcy draws a line between the existing claims to a firm’s assets and 
newly-arising claims . . . . If there are not enough assets to go around, 
some [existing] claims may be written down or extinguished. The ongoing 
operations of the business are treated entirely differently; new claims are 
paid in full as they arise. It is as if the bankruptcy process creates two 
separate firms—the pre-bankruptcy firm that pays off old claims against 
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It is well settled that the issue of what constitutes “property of the estate” 
within the meaning of § 541 is a federal question, and it is irrelevant that state law 
might not call the same interest “property.”55 That said, however, of necessity the 
nature and attributes of a debtor’s interest in that property will usually and 
necessarily be determined by reference to nonbankruptcy law, and most frequently 
state law. The Supreme Court established this principle in Butner v. United States,56 
holding that unless some federal interest requires a different result, property interests 
should be analyzed no differently in bankruptcy than under state law.57 
This holding could be seen as providing a basis for deviating, in the case 
of assigning a debtor’s cause of action to the estate, from the jurisprudence 
concerning claims against the estate and when they are deemed to arise.58 That 
conclusion, however, would be erroneous. Often regarded as making a more 
sweeping statement than it does about the relative role and authority of state versus 
federal law in bankruptcy cases,59 Butner actually does no more than express in the 
negative the basic truism that when a state-law property definition interferes with 
federal bankruptcy policy, the state-law rule is preempted under the Supremacy 
Clause of the federal Constitution.60 For example, in In re Kanter,61 the court 
invalidated a state statute that purported to defease the bankruptcy trustee of any 
interest in a prepetition personal-injury lawsuit.62 The court found that enforcement 
of that provision directly conflicted with the definition of “property of the estate” 
                                                                                                                
pre-bankruptcy assets, and the post-bankruptcy firm that acts as a brand-
new venture.  
Boston & Maine Corp. v. Chicago Pacific Corp., 785 F.2d 562, 565 (7th Cir. 1986); see also 
United Airlines, Inc. v. HSBC Bank USA, 416 F.3d 609 (7th Cir. 2005). While it is 
bankruptcy-rehabilitation policy that supports the analysis to which Judge Easterbrook refers 
in United Airlines, a Chapter 11 case, the fresh-start and equality policies call for the same 
sort of sharp demarcation in Chapter 7 between rights and obligations belonging to the 
debtor’s pre- and postfiling lives, respectively. 
 55. Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 1 (1924); McCarthy, 
Johnson, & Miller v. North Bay Plumbing, Inc. (In re Petit), 217 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 
2000) (stating that “whether an interest claimed by the debtor is ‘property of the estate’ is a 
federal question to be decided by federal law . . . .”); Anderson v. Rainsdon (In re Anderson), 
572 B.R. 743, 748 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 2017) (concluding that § 541(a) trumps any distinction 
under state law regarding whether an interest is property of the estate); Terry v. Evans, (In re 
Evans), 527 B.R. 228, 234–35 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2015) (holding federal law controls question 
of what constitutes property of the estate); see also cases cited supra note 36. 
 56. 440 U.S. 48 (1979). 
 57. Id. at 55. 
 58. See cases cited supra note 41–42. 
 59. See infra notes 245–52 and accompanying text. 
 60. See Ponoroff, supra note 17, at 1261–62; see also The Finley Group 
Liquidating Agent for RedF Marketing, LLC v. Roselli (In re Redf Marketing, LLC), 589 
B.R. 534, 542 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2018) (reliance on state law to determine relevant property 
interests in federal tax-refund claims would interfere with an important federal interest); infra 
text accompanying note 255–58. 
 61. Kanter v. Moneymaker, 505 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1974). 
 62.  Id. at 2321. 
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under the former bankruptcy law,63 as well as with the overall distributional priority 
scheme established by the 1898 Act.64 
Thus, state law will often identify the existence, elements, and 
characteristics of the cause of action. However, the determination of whether that 
claim belongs to the debtor’s pre- or postpetition life—i.e., whether it is property of 
the estate or of the debtor—must be resolved as a matter of federal law and under a 
standard that conforms to the purposive objectives of the Bankruptcy Code,65 just as 
the determination of when a claim against the estate arises is not driven by state-law 
rules.66 This is the point that the court overlooked in Cantu, and it is a point that is 
increasingly becoming a source of misunderstanding in the decisional law.67 
II. THE MAJORITY APPROACH TO STRADDLE CLAIMS 
A. The Continuing Viability of Segal v. Rochelle 
While intended to include every conceivable interest of the debtor in 
property as of the commencement of the case, § 541(a)(1) of the Code does not 
explicitly address how to assign a property interest that constitutes a straddle 
claim—again, defined as a postpetition right or payment that at least in part derives 
from prepetition events or activity.68 In that regard, the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Segal v. Rochelle,69 a case decided under the 1898 Act, remains precedential. This 
is due to the facts that (a) Congress did not materially alter language of the former 
                                                                                                                
 63. See Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898), repealed by Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 [hereinafter the “1898 Act”]. 
 64. Kanter, 502 F.2d at 231; see also Arrowsmith v. United States (In re Health 
Diagnostic Laboratory, Inc.), 578 B.R. 552, 563 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2017) (holding that the 
question of whether a debtor has an interest in property would be governed by federal, not 
state, law because of a countervailing federal interest established by the federal tax law). 
 65. See, e.g., Cohen v. Chernushin (In re Chernusin), 911 F.3d 1265, 1269  (10th 
Cir. 2018) (noting that while state law determines interests, once identified recourse must still 
be had to federal law to resolve the extent to which that interest is property of the state);  
Bavely v. United States (In re Terwilliger’s Catering Plus, Inc.), 911 F.2d 1168, 1172 (6th 
Cir. 1990) (holding that once the determination of property rights is made under state law, 
federal bankruptcy law dictates to what extent that interest is property of the estate for the 
purposes of § 541); Winick & Rich, P.C. v. Strada Design Assocs. (In re Strada Design 
Assocs.), 326 B.R. 229, 236 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“Section 541(a) is not restricted by state 
law concepts such as when a cause of action ripens or a statute of limitations begins to run, 
and ‘property of the estate’ may include claims that were inchoate on the petition date.”); see 
also supra note 55. 
 66. See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text. 
 67. See infra Section III.B. 
 68. See TABB, supra note 49, at §5.2, p. 402 (describing the issue). 
 69. 382 U.S. 375 (1966). 
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statute70 defining property of the estate when enacting the 1978 Code,71 and (b) both 
the Senate and House Reports accompanying adoption of the Code categorically 
state that the result reached in Segal is approved under the new law.72 
In Segal, the Court held:  
The main thrust of § 70a(5) [the precursor to § 541(a)(1) of the Code 
in relation to third party claims and causes of action] is to secure for 
creditors everything of value the bankrupt may possess in alienable 
or leviable form when he files his petition. To this end the term 
“property” has been construed most generously and an interest is not 
outside its reach because it is novel or contingent or because 
enjoyment must be postponed.73 
Distinguishing, for example, future wages, the Court in Segal found that a tax-loss 
carryback refund for a taxable year ended prior to the filing of the petition, but that 
was attributable to losses incurred prepetition, constituted property of the estate.74 
In articulating more broadly the test for ascertaining whether a property interest that 
formally emerges into existence or matures after the filing of the case becomes an 
asset of the estate, the Court held the inquiry should be whether the right in question 
was “sufficiently rooted in the pre-bankruptcy past . . . that it should not be excluded 
from property of the estate.”75 This test follows naturally from the broad definition 
of “property of the estate” and the expansive interpretation that language has 
received in the courts.76 
                                                                                                                
 70. Section 70a(5) of the 1898 Act provided, in pertinent part, that the estate 
would include “property, including rights of action, which prior to the filing of the petition 
he [the debtor] could have transferred or which might have been levied upon and sold under 
judicial process against him, or otherwise seized, impounded, or sequestered.” Act of July 1, 
1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
598, 92 Stat. 2549. 
 71. It is widely recognized that authority under the 1978 Act continues to be 
precedential except where expressly stated otherwise in the Code or legislative history. See 
United Savs. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd. 484 U.S. 365, 382 
(1987); see also George R. Pitts, Rights to Future Payment as Property of the Estate Under 
Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code, 64 AM. BANKR. L.J. 61, 63 (1990) (“What is striking 
about the leading cases under section 70(a) of the Bankruptcy Act, the predecessor of section 
541, however, is their construction of the term property without recourse to applicable 
nonbankruptcy law.”). 
 72. See S. REP. NO. 989, at 82 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 
5868; H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 180 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6323. 
 73. Segal, 382 U.S. at 379. 
 74. Id. at 382–84. 
 75. Id. at 379. The exercise thus requires linking property interests to particular 
events in time, in order to ascertain if the losses suffered or harm incurred by the debtor 
occurred before or after the bankruptcy filing. The Court also suggested a possible limitation 
of this rule tied to the fresh-start policy. Id. However, it is not clear that this aspect of the 
holding survived enactment of the Code. See infra note 339. 
 76. See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text. 
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Several circuit courts have conceded what is expressly stated in the 
legislative history; namely, that Segal remains good authority under the Code.77 The 
sufficiently rooted test advanced by the Court in Segal discriminates between rights 
to payment that, as of the time of filing, represent at least a contingent or potential 
property interest arising from prepetition events, even if unknown, and rights to 
payment either primarily tied to postpetition events or as to which the debtor has 
nothing more than a mere wish or expectation but no recognized legal entitlement 
until sometime after filing.78 Accordingly, if the claim is critically tied to the past 
and could become legally cognizable under applicable law, the Segal test is satisfied 
notwithstanding the fact that the right is not yet mature—not yet actionable—and 
indeed may never mature. 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in In re Ryerson is representative.79 It involved 
the value of a payment that the debtor was entitled to receive upon termination of 
his employment under certain conditions.80 As of the time of the debtor’s bankruptcy 
filing, the right to such payment had not yet vested and was still contingent on the 
occurrence of future events not certain to occur.81 The debtor’s employment was 
later terminated postfiling, and the right to the payment was therefore matured.82 
                                                                                                                
 77. See, e.g., Tyler v. D.H. Cap. Mgmt., Inc., 736 F.3d 455, 461 (6th Cir. 2013) 
(observing that most courts analyze whether an asset is estate property under Segal’s 
sufficiently rooted test); Parks v. Dittmar (In re Dittmar), 618 F.3d 1199, 1207 (10th Cir. 
2010); Fix v. First State Bank of Roscoe, 559 F.3d 803, 809 (8th Cir. 2009); Fruehauf Trailer 
Corp. Ret. Plan No. 003 (In re Fruehauf Trailer Corp.), 444 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2006); 
Witko v. Menoyye (In re Witko), 374 F.3d 1040, 1043 (11th Cir. 2004); In re Yonikus, 996 
F.2d 866, 869, 869 n.3 (7th Cir. 1993); In re Schneider, 864 F.2d 683, 685 (10th Cir. 1988); 
Rau v. Ryerson (In re Ryerson), 739 F.2d 1423, 1426 (9th Cir. 1984); Chartschlaa v. 
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 538 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2008) (providing a discussion of when 
even postpetition-acquired property will be property of the estate when it is sufficiently rooted 
in the prebankruptcy past); Riggs Nat’l Bank of Wash. D.C. v. First Am. Bank of Va. (In re 
Andrews), 80 F.3d 906, 910 (4th Cir. 1996); Brown v. Dellinger (In re Brown), 734 F.2d 119, 
123 (2d Cir. 1984); accord Jess v. Carey (In re Jess), 169 F.3d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(holding that attorneys’ fees paid postpetition but attributable to prepetition work were estate 
property even when receipt of a contingency fee depended on the debtor’s continued 
postpetition services). 
 78. See infra text accompanying notes 115–21. 
 79. Rau v. Ryerson (In re Ryerson), 739 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir. 1984). The Ninth 
Circuit’s Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s decision in Congrejo Invs., L.L.C. v. Mann (In re 
Bender), 385 B.R. 800 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2007), appeal dismissed, 586 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 
2009), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1085 (2013), appears to question the continued applicability of 
the Segal and Ryerson line of cases in the Ninth Circuit. Bender involved property transferred 
by the debtor to trust and then to an LLC in which the debtor had a one-third membership 
interest. Id. at *1. However, any suggestion that Bender might have been read at the time as 
casting into doubt the circuit court’s continuing adherence to Segal is belied by the fact that, 
in an opinion issued subsequent to the BAP’s decision in Bender, the Ninth Circuit relied on 
Segal in applying Code § 541(a). E.g., Leroux v. CPA Ins. Co., 720 Fed. Appx. 832 (9th Cir.); 
Yan v. Fu (In re Yan), 649 Fed. App’x 359 (9th Cir. 2016). 
           80.  Ryerson, 739 F.2d at 1424. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
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The court concluded that this payment, although it did not become choate or payable 
until well after the filing of the bankruptcy case, was property of the estate because 
it related to prepetition services.83 Thus, it was sufficiently rooted in the debtor’s 
prebankruptcy past, despite the uncertainty as of the time of filing whether the right 
to the payment would ever actually come due.84 In other words, under Ryerson and 
the traditional analysis governing claims that depend on both pre- and postpetition 
events, a postpetition benefit received pursuant to a prepetition entitlement is 
property of the estate. 
B. Other Varieties of Straddle Claims 
As with the contingent bonus payment in Ryerson, a tort claim based on 
exposure, contact, or circumstances occurring prior to filing bankruptcy is property 
of the estate, even if the cause, existence, and extent of the injury itself is not known 
until much later.85 The tort victim’s awareness of the cause of action should be 
irrelevant.86 What is relevant is when the events giving rise to the claim primarily 
took place.87 Consequently, when the cause of action accrues for state statute-of-
                                                                                                                
 83. Id. at 1425–26. 
 84. Id. (pointing out as well that because the payment related to prepetition 
services it would also be swept up under § 541(a)(6) concerning after-acquired property in 
the form of “[p]roceeds, product, offspring, rents, and profits of or from property of the 
estate”). 
 85. E.g., Mueller v. Hall (In re Parker), 368 B.R. 86, *7 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2007) 
(not selected for official publication) (“[T]he question in this case is not whether the 
malpractice claim accrued, based on the moment the last element of the cause of action 
accrued, prior to [the debtor] filing bankruptcy, but whether the malpractice claim is 
sufficiently rooted in [the debtor]’s pre-bankruptcy past to constitute property of the estate.”); 
Miller v. Pacific Shore Funding, 287 B.R. 47, 50 (D. Md. 2002) (“Property of the debtor does 
not escape the bankruptcy estate merely because the debtor is unaware of its existence.”); see 
also Tyler v. D.H. Cap. Mgmt., Inc., 736 F.3d 455, 462 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[A]ll causes of 
action that hypothetically could have been brought pre-petition are property of the estate. This 
is the case ‘even if the debtor[] w[as] unaware of the claim.’”) (internal citations omitted) 
(quoting In re Michael, 423 B.R. 323, 330 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2009); then quoting In re Hettick, 
413 B.R. 733, 752–53 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2009) (“If the cause of action accrued prior to a 
debtor’s petition date, it is an asset that must be scheduled. . . . Moreover, the accrued cause 
of action is property of the estate even if the debtors were unaware of the claim when they 
filed for bankruptcy protection.”)). 
 86. See Polis v. Getaways, Inc. (In re Polis), 217 F.3d 899, 902 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(noting even though the debtor did not bring her Truth in Lending Act and consumer 
protection claims until after filing for bankruptcy, the claims arose out of a transaction that 
occurred before bankruptcy and thus were property of her bankruptcy estate); In re Marci, 
No. 06 C 4441, 2007 WL 1958576, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 29, 2007) (“[w]hether aware of his 
injury or not,” plaintiff’s claim arose prior to bankruptcy and thus belonged to bankruptcy 
trustee); In re Saunders, No. 94–23489–BKC–RBR, 2003 WL 23239155, at *4 (Bankr. S.D. 
Fla. Dec. 10, 2003) (“[E]ven though the state statute of limitations governing how long the 
plaintiff has to institute a malpractice action may not have begun, a debtor may have a 
property interest.”). A plaintiff’s discovery of his or her cause of action, while potentially 
relevant to a statute-of-limitations analysis, does not affect the accrual of his or her claim for 
determining the nature of the bankruptcy estate.  
 87.  See, e.g., authorities cited supra note 77 and infra note 242. 
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limitations purposes or otherwise has no bearing on the determination of if it does 
or does not fall under § 541(a)(1). In a post-Ryerson decision, the Ninth Circuit 
expressed the point as follows: 
To determine when a cause of action accrues, we look to state 
law. . . . It is important, however, to distinguish principles of accrual 
from principles of discovery and tolling, which cause the statute of 
limitations to begin to run after accrual has occurred for purposes of 
ownership in a bankruptcy case. . . . We conclude that Cusano’s 
open book account claim accrued for bankruptcy purposes to the 
extent that sums were owed on that account at the time he filed his 
petition. An action could have been brought for those sums at that 
time. Our conclusion is not affected by the fact that limitations on 
such an action had not yet begun to run.88 
Particularly illuminating, and quite characteristic of the traditional analysis 
that has controlled the determination of property of the bankruptcy estate, is the 
Third Circuit’s decision in In re O’Dowd.89 In that case, the debtor purchased an 
apartment building in 1990 containing undisclosed structural flaws.90 In March 
1992, the debtor filed a Chapter 11 petition and thereafter hired an attorney 
[Attorney Two] to represent her in both the bankruptcy case and in a malpractice 
action against the attorney [Attorney One] who had represented her in the real-estate 
purchase.91 In 1994, the debtor’s case converted to Chapter 7,92 and a discharge order 
was entered in December 1994.93 Shortly thereafter, Attorney Two withdrew and 
debtor hired Attorney Three to represent her in the malpractice action.94 In May 
1995, the trustee proposed to settle the malpractice case for $10,000.95 Debtor 
objected and the bankruptcy court allowed the case to proceed in state court with the 
understanding that the trustee would receive the first $10,000 of proceeds.96 
The debtor subsequently fired Attorney Three and hired Attorney Four to 
represent her in the malpractice case, and in 1996 the case settled for an undisclosed 
amount.97 Sometime later, the debtor discovered that Attorney Two had left out a 
number of causes of action against Attorney One, which were now time-barred.98 In 
November 1996, the debtor brought a malpractice action against Attorneys Two and 
Three based on the omitted claims.99 Attorney Three filed a motion to dismiss for 
                                                                                                                
 88. See Cusano v. Klein, 264 F.3d 936, 947 (9th Cir. 2001); D.H. Capital Mgmt., 
Inc., 736 F.3d at 463 (“[A]ccrual for the purposes of § 541 is different from accrual for statute-
of-limitations purposes.”); see also infra note 136 and accompanying text. 
 89. O’Dowd v. Truegar, 233 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 90. Id. at 199. 
 91. Id. at 200. 
 92. Id.  
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id.  
 99. Id. 
118 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 61:101 
lack of standing on the ground that the action represented property of the estate.100 
At the direction of the state court, the parties returned to the bankruptcy court for a 
determination on Attorney Three’s assertion.101 The bankruptcy court ruled that the 
postdischarge suit constituted property of the estate under Segal, despite the 
argument, with which the court agreed, that the cause of action did not accrue until 
1996 when the debtor learned of the omitted claims, well after the debtor’s 
bankruptcy case had been closed.102 
On appeal, the district court affirmed on the basis of the bankruptcy court’s 
alternative analysis that, because the claims could be traced directly to Attorney 
One’s prepetition conduct, the postpetition malpractice action represented an 
interest in property acquired by the estate after the commencement of the case within 
the meaning of § 541(a)(7).103 The Third Circuit concurred.104 Under either 
approach, the claim—which clearly did not arise until well after the commencement 
of the case—was property of the estate because, temporally, most (albeit surely not 
all) of the underlying circumstances and activities giving rise to its existence 
occurred in the debtor’s prebankruptcy past.105 
Straddle claims also come in more than one flavor. In one type of situation, 
the debtor may have been exposed to a harmful agent prior to the commencement of 
the bankruptcy case but may not manifest a legal injury until after filing.106 In 
another case, all of the elements of the cause of action may have occurred prior to 
bankruptcy filing, including the injury, but the debtor may not become aware of the 
casual connection until postfiling.107 The first situation is properly analyzed under 
the Segal standard; namely, whether the claim is sufficiently rooted in the debtor’s 
prebankruptcy past.108 In the latter scenario, the claim belongs entirely to the past 
because, at filing, it was neither contingent nor uncertain in any fashion. Rather, it 
is simply that the victim did not discover the existence of the cause of action until 
                                                                                                                
 100. Id. at 201. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 201, 203. 
 103. Id. Code § 541(a)(7) includes as “property of the estate” any interest in 
property acquired by the estate after the commencement of the case. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(7). 
 104. O’Dowd, 233 F.3d at 203 (rejecting the debtor’s argument that the claim 
belonged to her because it did not accrue under state law until after the bankruptcy case had 
been commenced). 
 105. Id. at 204 (noting the bankruptcy estate was the injured party). 
 106. That was, for example, the situation in Cantu v. Schmidt (In re Cantu), 784 
F.3d 253, 255 (5th Cir. 2015). See supra text accompanying note 24. 
 107. See, e.g., Arnot v. Endresen (In re Endresen), 530 B.R. 856 (Bankr. D. Ore. 
2015), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 548 B.R. 258 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 2016); In re Richards, 249 
B.R. 859, 861 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2000) (“All of the allegedly wrongful conduct giving rise 
to the debtor’s claim occurred prepetition, and indeed more than twenty-five years prepetition. 
Further, although the diagnosis was made seven months after the petition was filed, that 
timing appears to have been more a result of happenstance than of medical necessity.”). In 
some situations, of course, it is impossible to draw a fixed line in terms of when an injury is 
suffered because the onset and progression of a particular disease resulting from product 
exposure are not knowable with scientific certainty. See infra text accompanying note 275. 
 108. Supra text accompanying note 75. 
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much later, doubtlessly tolling the state statute of limitations, but having no effect 
on the fact that the claim is a property interest includable with the property of the 
estate.109 Thus, although it is technically still governed by Segal, the conclusion that 
the interest belongs to the estate can be in little question or doubt. Nonetheless, as 
discussed below,110 without clearly distinguishing the two situations (or even 
acknowledging the significance of the distinction),111 certain recent decisions have 
gone off the rails in both scenarios, applying a “discovery” or “accrual” rule, rather 
than a rule derived from and driven by the bankruptcy-specific principles that govern 
ownership of property interests in a bankruptcy case. 
Rounding out the picture, it is helpful to point out that once the debtor 
discovers the existence of a claim belonging to his or her past, the obligation to 
notify the court is clear. Specifically, the duty of a debtor seeking shelter under the 
bankruptcy laws to disclose all assets, or potential assets, to the bankruptcy court is 
a continuing one: it does not end with the filing of the initial forms and schedules; 
rather, a debtor must amend his or her financial statements if circumstances change 
or new assets are discovered.112 Because this duty derives from §§ 521(a)(1) and 
541(a)(7) of the Code, the duty of continuing disclosure is not chapter-specific; it is 
applicable in all cases under the Code.113 Full and honest disclosure in a bankruptcy 
case assures equitable treatment and maximization of value for prepetition 
creditors.114 Indeed it is regarded as so crucial to the effective functioning of the 
federal bankruptcy system that 18 U.S.C. § 152 makes it a crime for any person to 
“knowingly and fraudulently conceal from a . . . trustee. . . in connection with a case 
under title 11, any property belonging to the estate of a debtor.” 
C. The “Crop Disaster Payment” Cases 
At first blush, three courts of appeals decisions might appear to cast into 
question the continued viability of Segal under the Code.115 However, even to the 
                                                                                                                
 109. See, e.g., In re Carroll, 586 B.R. 775, 782–83 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2018) 
(distinguishing between a situation where all of the elements of a legal interest exist as of the 
commencement of the case, regardless of the debtor’s knowledge, and circumstances where 
one or more element of the cause of action is missing); Engelby v. I.C. Sys., Inc., No. 17-CV-
0296 , 2018 WL 1514246, at *6 (D. Minn. Mar. 27, 2018) (distinguishing the situation where 
an unlawful act occurs prefiling but no injury occurs until later, from a case where the 
unlawful acts themselves did not occur until after the filing of the petition); see also sources 
cited supra note 85; infra text accompanying notes 120–21. 
 110. See infra Section III.B. 
 111. See infra note 244. 
 112. See Billups v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc. (In re Burnes), 291 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th 
Cir. 2002); Brown Manufacturing v. Mims (In re Coastal Plains, Inc.), 179 F.3d 187, 207– 
08 (5th Cir. 1999); In re De-Rosa Grund, 544 B.R. 339, 376 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2016) 
(discussing a debtor’s continuing duty of disclosure in bankruptcy). 
 113. See 11 U.S.C. § 103. 
 114. See supra note 52. 
 115. They are: Bracewell v. Kelly (In re Bracewell), 454 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 
2006); Burgess v. Sikes (In re Burgess), 438 F.3d 493 (5th Cir. 2006); Drewes v. Vote (In re 
Vote), 276 F.3d 1024 (8th Cir. 2002). 
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extent that these cases represent good authority,116 they are, upon closer analysis, 
easily harmonized with the holding in Segal and the majority approach for 
determining when straddle claims represent property of the estate. All three cases 
involved the identical factual milieu—i.e., a postfiling, federal crop-disaster 
payment received by the debtor in respect of a prefiling crop loss.117 In concluding 
that the payment was not property of the estate, each of the opinions justified its 
holding on the ground that, as of the date of filing, Congress had not yet authorized 
the federal program under which the payments were made.118 Thus, at the time of 
filing, the prospect of recovery was nothing more than a “mere hope.” Even though 
the events triggering entitlement to payment were rooted in the past, the actual legal 
right to payment did not arise (exist) until after the bankruptcy filing.119 
In sharp contrast with those decisions, in the typical straddle-claim 
situation, the claim does not depend on the promulgation of a new law or the creation 
of a new right after the commencement of the bankruptcy case. To the contrary, the 
right exists prepetition but is contingent, unknown, or for other reasons, not a fully 
choate legal interest as of the bankruptcy filing.120 Conversely, in the case of a latent 
injury, the resultant claim is more than a mere hope or expectation: it is a well-
recognized state or common law claim for relief, even if it is not yet ripe under state 
law. Therefore, the debtor’s knowledge, or even ability to know, of the claim should 
have no bearing on its inclusion in the bankruptcy estate.121 
Illustrating the salience of the distinction between an established right to 
payment and a hope that such a right might arise in the future is the Eleventh 
Circuit’s decision in In re Thomas.122 The issue in Thomas involved a dispute over 
the proceeds of a postpetition real-estate sale that arose from a prepetition option 
contract. In a per curiam opinion, the court distinguished its earlier crop-disaster 
decision,123 stating that, in the current case, the debtor had more than a “mere hope, 
wish and prayer” that he might profit from the option contract.124 He had a valid, 
                                                                                                                
 116. In his dissent in Bracewell, Judge Pryor pointed out, inter alia, that the 
majority overlooked two “venerable” decisions of the Supreme Court (Williams v. Heard, 
140 U.S. 529 (1891) and Milnor v. Metz, 41 U.S. 221 (1842)), which established that property 
rights are created by reason of losses suffered, not by later legislation providing compensation 
for such losses. 454 F.3d at 1251. 
117.  Bracewell, 454 F.3d at 1236; Burgess, 438 F.3d at 495; Drewes, 276 F.3d at 
1026. 
 118. In Drewes, 276 F.3d at 1026, the court explicitly noted that this fact 
distinguishes the case from Segal. 
 119. The distinction between a legal right to payment (even if contingent) and a 
“mere hope” also finds instantiation in the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Sliney v. Battley (In re 
Schmitz), 270 F.2d 1254, 1258 (9th Cir. 2001), involving the value of future fishing quotas, 
granted seven years after filing, although calculated by reference to prefiling landings of 
halibut and sablefish. 
 120. E.g., In re Carroll, 586 B.R. 775, 787–88 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2018). 
 121. See sources cited supra notes 85, 86, and infra note 136. 
 122. Thomas v. Bender, 516 Fed. App’x 875 (11th Cir. 2013). 
 123.  See Billups v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc. (In re Burnes), 291 F.3d 1282, 1286 
(11th Cir. 2002). 
 124. Thomas, 516 Fed. Appx. at 878. 
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cognizable legal interest in the property as of the commencement of the case, even 
though that interest was not fully matured.125 
Similarly, in In re Endresen, in 2004, the debtors purchased ten residential 
lots in a Portland, Oregon subdivision, intending to use them as rental properties.126 
Unbeknownst to the debtors, these homes suffered from construction defects that, 
over time, resulted in significant damage.127 The debtors filed bankruptcy in June 
2011, and their case was closed as a “no asset” case in October of the same year.128 
In 2013, the debtors became coplaintiffs in a suit against the developer of the 
subdivision that included the debtors’ ten lots.129 In that action, the debtors claimed 
to have first learned of the construction defects in 2012.130 In 2014, the debtors 
settled their claims against the developer based on the construction defects for 
$318,200.131 The trustee then sought to reopen the debtors’ bankruptcy case, urging 
that the settlement proceeds belonged to the bankruptcy estate.132 
Relying on Oregon law, the debtors countered that their construction defect 
claims did not “accrue” until they discovered their existence, which was well after 
their bankruptcy case had been not only been filed, but actually closed and that, 
consequently, the settlement proceeds in question were not property of the estate.133 
Certainly, the first part of the argument was true as a matter of Oregon law.134 Citing 
the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Cusano v. Klein,135 however, the bankruptcy court 
disagreed with the debtors’ legal analysis regarding § 541(a), noting that principles 
                                                                                                                
 125. Id.; see also Tyler v. D.H. Capital Mgmt., Inc., 736 F.3d 455, 461 (6th Cir. 
2013) (noting that most courts follow Segal). 
 126. 530 B.R. 856, 859–60 (Bankr. D. Or. 2015), aff’d in part, rev’d in part Arnot 
v. Endresen, 548 B.R. 258, 261 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2016). It is important to note that the issue 
on appeal from the bankruptcy court’s decision was whether the settlement proceeds, once 
they became property of the estate, were “proceeds” of the mortgages encumbering the lots, 
such that they became subject to liens of the holders of those mortgages and thereby enjoyed 
priority over the trustee’s claim. Id. at 264. While the BAP reversed the bankruptcy court’s 
decision awarding the trustee the share of the settlement proceeds that belonged to one of 
these lenders under the so-called equities of the case exception to § 552(b)(1) of the Code, 
the point to be made is that the threshold analysis of the bankruptcy court regarding whether 
the settlement proceeds were property of the estate to begin with was undisturbed on appeal. 
Id. at 273–74. 
 127. Endresen, 530 B.R. at 861. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id.  
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 863. 
 134. See Abraham v. T. Henry Const., Inc., 249 P.3d 534, 536 n.3 (Or. 2011); Berry 
v. Branner, 421 P.2d 996, 1000 (Or. 1966); Tavtigian-Coburn v. All Star Custom Homes, 
LLC, 337 P.3d 925, 926 (Or. Ct. App. 2014). 
 135. 264 F.3d 936, 947 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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of accrual must be distinguished from principles of discovery and tolling that might 
cause a statute of limitations to run after accrual has occurred.136 
The court continued that, in determining when a cause of action accrues for 
purposes of ownership in a bankruptcy proceeding, the time of discovery is not 
relevant to the inquiry.137 Referring to Segal as the “touchstone” for ascertaining 
when assets are regarded as prepetition and, thus, property of the estate,138 the court 
concluded that the construction defect, and the existence of the claim at issue, arose 
at the time of the faulty construction of the residences, years prior to the bankruptcy 
filing.139 At that point in time (and at all points thereafter), the debtors had a legal 
right to seek redress from the developer for the construction flaws. The fact that 
these defects went undiscovered until after the closing of the case was, as the court 
phrased it, “merely fortuitous.”140 In effect, all of the alleged wrongful conduct and 
the consequent injury and damages giving rise to the debtors’ claim occurred 
prepetition. For this reason, the claim was not only sufficiently rooted but actually 
completely rooted in the past. 
III. STRADDLE CLAIMS IN THE CASE LAW: THE BURGEONING (AND 
WRONG) MINORITY VIEW 
A. Pre-2015 
Up until about the time of the Fifth Circuit’s Cantu decision,141 the 
overwhelming number of reported court decisions followed the type of analysis 
employed by the bankruptcy court in Endresen for deciding whether straddle claims 
                                                                                                                
 136. Id. at 947–48; see sources cited supra note 85; see also Goldstein v. Stahl (In 
re Goldstein), 526 B.R. 13 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 2015) (citing Cusano in support of the proposition 
that accrual for § 541 purposes is different from accrual for statute-of-limitations purposes). 
 137. Endresen, 530 B.R. at 864 (citing Tyler v. D.H. Capital Mgmt., Inc., 736 F.3d 
455, 462 (6th Cir. 2013)). 
 138. Id. at 865. Other recent cases applying Segal consistent with this view include: 
In re Whittick, 547 B.R. 628, 635–36 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2016) (applying Segal to find that a 
prepetition loan approval gave the debtor an interest in funds that became property of the 
estate under §§ 541(a)(1) and (a)(6) when the funds were received postpetition); In re Kooi, 
547 B.R. 244, 248 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2016) (noting that in applying § 541(a)(1), “most 
courts analyze whether the asset is ‘sufficiently rooted in the pre-bankruptcy past’ of the 
debtor”); In re Segura, No. 07-31907, 2016 WL 829830, at *2 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2016) 
(“Since Segal, courts, including the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, analyze whether an asset 
received by a debtor postpetition is ‘sufficiently rooted in the pre-bankruptcy past’ of the 
debtor such that it should be regarded as property of the bankruptcy estate.”); see also sources 
cited supra note 136. 
 139. Endresen, 530 B.R. at 865 (citing In re Richards, 249 B.R. 859, 861 (Bankr. 
E.D. Mich. 2000) (following Segal’s sufficiently rooted test)). 
 140. Id. (noting that this was likely due to the fact that the properties were rentals 
and that the Endresens were absentee landlords). 
 141. See Cantu v. Schmidt (In re Cantu), 784 F.3d 253 (5th Cir. 2015). 
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belonged to the estate.142 For example, in Field v. Transcontinental Ins. Co.,143 the 
court found a claim for bad-faith refusal to defend an insured constituted property 
of the estate, even though the debtor did not request, nor did the insurer refuse, 
indemnification until more than eight months after the bankruptcy case had been 
filed.144 The district court in Field acknowledged as a “difficult question” whether 
the debtor had any prepetition cause of action as a matter of state law.145 Ultimately, 
however, the court concluded that it was unnecessary to resolve that question 
“because the bankrupt’s estate includes not only claims that had accrued and were 
ripe at the time the petition was filed, but also those claims that accrued post-
petition, but that ‘are sufficiently rooted in the pre-bankruptcy past.’”146 As Field 
demonstrates, these decisions employing a Segal analysis included,147 but were not 
limited to, situations involving latent tort injury.148 
Against this mostly unified judicial approach to straddle claims there was 
some, albeit largely scant, pre-2015 authority deviating from Segal’s sufficiently 
rooted approach and adopting the alternative view that in order for a debtor’s cause 
of action to be regarded as “estate property” it must have been “accrued” or 
                                                                                                                
 142. E.g., Johnson, Blakely, Pope, Bokor, Ruppel & Burns, P.A v. Alvarez (In re 
Alvarez), 224 F.3d 1273, 1276–77 (11th Cir. 2000) (the last of the three elements of the state-
law cause of action for legal malpractice had been satisfied at the moment of the bankruptcy 
filing; therefore, the court found the claim to be property of the estate, holding that in deciding 
ownership over the claim for bankruptcy purposes, the time of discovery of the injury 
sufficient (or necessary) to commence the statute of limitations under state law is irrelevant); 
see also Casey v. Grasso (In re Riccitelli), 320 B.R. 483, 491 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005) (opining 
that whether a cause of action is property of the estate does not turn on whether, under state 
law, the cause of action has accrued as of the petition date); Richards, 249 B.R. at 861 
(determining whether a cause of action is property of the estate, the test is not the date that 
cause of action accrues under state law; appropriate inquiry is whether cause of action is 
sufficiently rooted in debtor’s prebankruptcy past). 
 143. 219 B.R. 115 (E.D. Va. 1998), aff’d, 173 F.3d 424 (4th Cir. 1999). 
  144. Id. at 118. 
 145. Id. at 119 (“In short, whether Dangerfield had a ripe, viable bad faith or 
declaratory judgment action at the time of the petition is a difficult question as to which there 
is no controlling precedent.”). 
 146. Id. (quoting Segal); see also cases cited supra note 85. 
 147. Jenkins v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc. (In re Jenkins), 410 B.R. 182, 186–87 
(Bankr. W.D. Va. 2008) (damages resulting from a personal-injury claim based on an incident 
occurring prepetition, but that were not manifest until after the commencement of the case, 
were nonetheless property of the estate); In re Richards, 249 B.R. 859, 861 (Bankr. E.D. 
Mich. 2000) (holding that cause of action for asbestos-related injuries was property of the 
estate). 
 148. Some examples of cases involving tort-based claims include: In re Tomaiolo, 
205 B.R. 10, aff’d sub nom. Tomaiolo v. Rodolakis (In re Tomaiolo), No. 90-40350, 2002 
WL 226133 (D. Mass. Feb. 06, 2002) (involving legal malpractice claims); Winick & Rich, 
P.C. v. Strada Design Assocs. (In re Strada Design Assocs.), 326 B.R. 229 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2005) (stating, also in connection with an analysis of legal malpractice claims, “[s]ection 
541(a) is not restricted by state law concepts such as when a cause of action ripens or a statute 
of limitations begins to run, and ‘property of the estate’ may include claims that were inchoate 
on the petition date”). 
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“discovered” consonant with state-law considerations of ripeness and statute-of-
limitations analysis.149 The two most notable decisions were the bankruptcy courts’ 
opinions in In re Smith150 and In re Holstein,151 although those cases, like Cantu 
itself,152 were capable of being read somewhat more narrowly, as explained more 
fully below. 
To begin with, the court in Smith proceeded from the misbegotten premise 
that “[s]tate law determines when an interest becomes property of the estate.”153 It 
is true that, unless some federal interest dictates otherwise, state law generally 
defines what constitutes a property interest.154 However, as discussed earlier, it is 
widely understood that what is property of the bankruptcy estate is a matter 
determined solely by federal law.155 Multiple circuit courts of appeal have 
recognized that the breadth of the Code’s articulation of “property of the estate” 
reflects Congress’s intent to include “[e]very conceivable interest of the debtor, 
future, nonpossessory, contingent, speculative, and derivative, is within the reach of 
§ 541.”156 This is intended to ensure that anything of value extant as of the 
commencement of the case, whether considered “property” or not under state law,157 
can be liquidated and distributed in order to maximize prepetition creditors’ 
recovery. 
On the merits, the court in Smith reached its decision that the debtor’s 
postbankruptcy settlement payment from the Fen-Phen class action was not property 
of the estate based on the court’s interpretation of the Kansas statute regarding 
accrual of causes of action for state-law personal-injury claims.158 Pursuant to that 
statute, which imposes a two-year statute of limitations for such claims, a cause of 
action does not accrue until a wrongful act causes substantial injury.159 Thus, 
according to the court in Smith, even though the debtor’s use of the drug occurred 
                                                                                                                
 149. See supra text accompanying notes 25–31. 
 150. 293 B.R. 786 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2003). 
 151. Holstein v. Knopfler, 321 B.R. 229 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2005); see also In re 
Hertogh, 412 B.R. 24 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2009); Swift v. Seidler (In re Swift), 198 B.R. 927 
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1996). 
 152. See supra text accompanying note 32. 
 153. Smith, 293 B.R. at 778–79. 
 154. See supra text accompanying notes 36, 55, and 65. 
 155. See Sierra Switchboard Co. v. Westinghouse Elec., Inc., 789 F.2d 705,  
708–09 (9th Cir. 1986); see also authorities cited supra notes 42, 54, and 111 (making clear 
beyond any serious argument that property of the estate, ultimately, is a matter determined 
under federal law). 
 156. Tyler v. D.H. Cap. Mgmt., Inc., 736 F.3d 455, 461 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting In 
re Yonikus, 996 F.2d 866, 869 (7th Cir. 1993); see also Rau v. Ryerson (In re Ryerson), 739 
F.2d 1423, 1425 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing legislative history); In re Dittmar, 618 F.3d 1199, 
1207 (10th Cir. 2010) (“[E]very conceivable interest of the debtor, future, nonpossessory, 
contingent, speculative, and derivative, is within reach of 11 U.S.C. § 541.”); additional 
authorities cited supra note 43. 
 157. This, of course, includes causes of action in favor of the debtor. See sources 
cited supra note 43. 
 158. K.S.A. § 60-513(b). 
 159. In re Smith, 293 B.R. 786, 789 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2003). 
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prefiling, the trustee could not prevail in claiming the settlement proceeds as 
property of the estate without showing that the debtor suffered substantial injury, 
and that such injury was reasonably ascertainable, as of the time of the 
commencement of the debtor’s bankruptcy case.160 
In the face of myriad authority that accrual for purposes of the 
commencement of a state statute of limitations is not determinative of whether a 
claim is property of the estate,161 the Smith court’s legal holding was and remains 
suspect. In addition, the facts of the case itself are distinguishable from cases like 
Endresen. In Smith, the trustee could demonstrate only ingestion of Fen-Phen prior 
to the bankruptcy filing, but no prefiling injury.162 Thus, a key element of the 
applicable state-law cause of action could not be established as of the date of filing. 
In Endersen, although not yet known by the debtors, all of the elements of the cause, 
including injury and consequent damages, had unquestionably occurred or were 
satisfied before the commencement of the debtors’ bankruptcy case.163 
This distinction might be pressed into service to form a basis for 
reconciling the outcomes in the two cases.164 However, it would still entail carving 
out an exception to Segal that would be difficult to square with the actual holding of 
the Supreme Court in that case, inasmuch as the absence of observable injury may 
bear on, but does not resolve definitively, which side of the bankruptcy filing the 
claim is most critically rooted.165 Thus, at the time it was decided, Smith was out-of-
step with the strong, prevailing majority approach for deciding when emerging 
property interests constitute property of the estate.166 
The claim at issue in Holstein was the debtor’s cause of action against his 
former bankruptcy lawyers, who, the debtor maintained, had committed malpractice 
in the handling of an objection to discharge in the case, thereby causing the debtor’s 
                                                                                                                
 160. Id. 
 161. E.g., D.H. Cap. Mgmt., Inc., 736 F.3d at 461 (“The nature and extent of 
property rights in bankruptcy are determined by the ‘underlying substantive law.’”) (citing 
Raleigh v. Ill. Dep’t of Rev., 530 U.S. 15, 20 (2000)). “But ‘once that determination is made, 
federal bankruptcy law dictates to what extent that interest is property of the estate’ for the 
purposes of § 541.” Id.  (citing Bavely v. United States (In re Terwilliger’s Catering Plus, 
Inc.), 911 F.2d 1168, 1172 (6th Cir. 1990)); Cusano v. Klein, 264 F.3d 936, 947 (9th Cir. 
2001) (“It is important, however, to distinguish principles of accrual from principles of 
discovery and tolling, which may cause the statute of limitations to begin to run after accrual 
has occurred for purposes of ownership in a bankruptcy case.”); see also supra notes 85 and 
136 and accompanying text. 
 162. Smith, 293 B.R. at 790 (noting that the plaintiff was asymptomatic when she 
discontinued use of the drug and filed for bankruptcy). 
 163. See supra text accompanying notes 114–19. 
 164. The same distinction could be made in Cantu v. Schmidt (In re Cantu), 784 
F.3d 253 (5th Cir. 2015). See supra notes 25–28, 32 and accompanying text. 
 165. Some decisions, even in purporting to follow Segal, make more of the 
distinction than is warranted. See, e.g., In re Davis, 589 B.R. 146 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2018).  
 166. It is also out of step with many cases decided since 2015. See cases cited supra 
note 138 and infra note 242. 
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discharge to be denied unnecessarily.167 The court concluded the claim was not 
property of the estate because there was no injury to the debtor until the actual denial 
of discharge, which did not occur until three years into the case.168 Of course, this 
rationale ignored the fact that simply because the question of damages flowing from 
a breach of duty may still be contingent should have no bearing under a Segal-type 
analysis, provided that the conduct at issue predated in the main the bankruptcy 
filing.169 
The trustee in Holstein did not disagree with the court’s conclusion that the 
debtor’s claim did not accrue under Illinois law until postfiling.170 Rather, he 
asserted that the date of filing was irrelevant because Segal’s sufficiently rooted test 
focuses on when the breach of duty occurred.171 While conceding that it was taking 
a narrower view of the Supreme Court’s holding in Segal than what it acknowledged 
to be the interpretation followed by the majority of courts,172 the court rejected the 
argument on the ground that “[t]he broader reading some courts have given Segal is 
not consistent with Butner or with the plain reading of § 541(a)(1).”173 Instead, the 
court held that Segal “does not expand estate property to include legal or equitable 
interests a debtor acquires post-petition, as long as a clever trustee can tie those 
interests to the ‘pre-bankruptcy past.’”174 Therefore, because the debtor’s cause of 
action for legal malpractice did not exist under Illinois law as of the commencement 
of his bankruptcy case, the court concluded that it was not property of the estate.175 
Once again, the opinion in Holstein can be factually distinguished from a 
number of other straddle-claim cases that reach the opposite conclusion. 
Specifically, the Holstein court based its holding on the elements of malpractice in 
Illinois: (1) an attorney-client relationship, giving rise to a duty of care; (2) a breach 
of that duty; and (3) actual damages or injury proximately resulting from the 
breach.176 The court found that Holstein suffered no injury until after his discharge 
was denied, and until that point, there was still a chance that the discharge objection 
would be unsuccessful.177 Therefore, the court reasoned, there could have been no 
legal malpractice claim as of the commencement of the case.178 Conversely, as noted 
                                                                                                                
 167. Holstein v. Knopfler, 321 B.R. 229, 233 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2005). 
 168. Id. at 236 (noting that, as of the date of the filing of the case, the debtor had 
not yet suffered any loss). 
 169. Supra text accompanying notes 42 and 78. 
         170.  Holstein, 321 B.R. at 237. 
 171. Id.  
 172. Id. at 237–38. 
 173. Id. at 238. 
         174.        Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 235. 
 177.  Id. at 236. 
 178. Id.; cf. Witko v. Menotte (In re Witko), 374 F.3d 1040 (11th Cir. 2004). In 
Witko, the court concluded that under state law the debtor’s legal malpractice cause of action 
did not exist until his alimony action concluded with an adverse outcome that was proximately 
caused by his attorney’s negligence. Id. at 1043. That did not happen until after the debtor’s 
bankruptcy filing and thus could not be traced to an injury occurring prior to or 
contemporaneous with the bankruptcy filing. Id. at 1044. For an example of a case where, 
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above, where all of the elements of the debtor’s claim have occurred prior to the 
filing of the bankruptcy case, the prevailing view is that the claim is swept under  
§ 541(a) even if the debtor had no knowledge of the claim’s existence until a later 
time.179 Indeed, Holstein might also be distinguished based on the fact that the 
breach of duty itself, and not just the injury flowing therefrom, occurred postfiling. 
Thus, it is possible to rationalize (albeit imperfectly) the decision in Holstein with 
the majority approach to straddle claims, although again, Holstein’s narrow 
construction of Segal, and its deference to state-law analysis regarding accrual, were 
and remain untenable.180 
Unlike the court’s opinion in Smith,181 the Holstein opinion did properly 
recognize that federal law determines when a debtor’s interest in property is property 
of the estate under § 541 of the federal Bankruptcy Code.182 However, the decision 
to reflexively revert to state-law concepts nonetheless represented a weak and 
largely isolated minority view at the time the opinion was issued. Moreover, 
Holstein’s suggestion that the reading given to Segal by the majority of courts is not 
consistent with the language of Code § 541(a)(1)183 is questionable,184 and it has 
received little traction in subsequent decisional law. For example, in Putizer v. Ace 
Hardware Corp.,185 decided by a district court in the same district as the bankruptcy 
court’s decision in Holstein, the debtor argued that his fraud claims belonged to him 
rather than his bankruptcy estate because, due to Ace’s fraudulent concealment, he 
                                                                                                                
based on a Segal-type analysis, the legal malpractice was found to occur at (rather than after) 
the filing of the bankruptcy petition, and the resultant claims were determined to be includable 
in the debtor’s estate irrespective of whether they had technically accrued prepetition under 
state law, see In re Sheikhzadeh, No. 14-14219-BFK, 2018 WL 3197752, at *6 (Bankr. E.D. 
Va. 2018). 
 179. See, e.g., In re Carroll, 586 B.R. 775, 790 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2018) (contrasting 
a case where there was no prepetition injury with the instant cases where the claims in 
question were “not merely ‘rooted’ in the prepetition period, but which germinated, sprouted, 
grew, blossomed, and became anchored prepetition”); In re Endresen, 530 B.R. 856 (Bankr. 
D. Ore. 2015), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, Arnot v. Endresen, 548 B.R. 258 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 
2016) (discussed supra text accompanying notes 126–140); see also supra notes 106–09 and 
accompanying text. 
 180. Whatever factual nuances might be found to offer some superficial 
harmonization of Holstein don’t alter the basic fact that, ultimately, the court reached its 
decision based on state-law rubrics rather than an overriding federal standard. On this critical 
aspect, there is no way to reconcile Holstein with decisions such as Winick & Rich, P.C. v. 
Strada Design Assocs. (In re Strada Design Assocs.), 326 B.R. 229 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
and In re Tomaiolo, 205 B.R. 10, 13 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997), aff’d sub nom. Tomaiolo v. 
Rodolakis (In re Tomaiolo), No. 90-40350, 2002 WL 226133 (E.D. Mass. Feb. 6, 2002). 
 181. See supra text accompanying note 153. 
 182. Holstein, 321 B.R. at 234 (drawing the distinction between this point and the 
role of state law generally in defining property interests). 
 183. Id. at 238. 
 184. The language of the 1898 Act that Court was construing in Segal (§ 70a(5)) 
was for all intents and purposes identical to the language of Code § 541(a)(1). See supra note 
68 and accompanying text. 
 185. 50 F. Supp. 3d 964 (N.D. Ill. 2014). 
128 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 61:101 
was not aware of his cause of action until after the close of his bankruptcy case.186 
The court had this to say: 
For the purpose of § 541 of the Bankruptcy Code, a claim or cause of 
action has accrued when all of the “elements of the cause of action 
had occurred as of the time the bankruptcy case was commenced, so 
that the claim is sufficiently rooted in the debtor’s prebankruptcy 
past.187 
The court continued: “[A] debtor’s actual knowledge of a claim is irrelevant to 
whether he had a property interest at the time of bankruptcy.”188  
The opinion in Putizer only mentioned Holstein once, and then only for the 
innocuous proposition that property acquired postpetition is not property of the 
estate.189 In sum, therefore, both Smith and Holstein, and perhaps one or two others 
like them,190 were outliers when decided. Furthermore, in each case, the trustee was 
unable to prove the existence of an injury prior to the filing of the bankruptcy case, 
and thus, they could be read as stopping short of a wholesale rejection of the majority 
approach to straddle claims.191 However, the larger point to be made is that, although 
                                                                                                                
         186.  Id. at 983. 
 187. Id. at 982 (quoting Paul v. USIS Commercial Servs., Inc., No. 04 RB 1384 
CBS, 2006 WL 2385202, at *2 (D. Colo. Aug. 17, 2006)); Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 
380 (1966). 
         188.  Putizer, 50 F. Supp. 3d at 983. The court proceeded to cite the following in 
support of this proposition: 
See In re Polis,  217 F.3d 899, 902 (7th Cir. 2000) (even though debtor 
did not bring her Truth in Lending Act and consumer protection claims 
until after filing for bankruptcy, the claims arose out of a transaction that 
occurred before bankruptcy and thus were property of her bankruptcy 
estate); In re Macri, No. 06 C 4441, 2007 WL 1958576, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 
June 29, 2007) (“[w]hether aware of his injury or not,” plaintiff’s claim 
arose prior to bankruptcy and thus belonged to bankruptcy trustee); In re 
Saunders, No. 94–23489–BKC–RBR, 2003 WL 23239155, at *4 
(Bankr.S.D.Fla. Dec. 10, 2003) (“[E]ven though the state statute of 
limitations governing how long the plaintiff has to institute a malpractice 
action may not have begun, a debtor may have a property interest.”). A 
plaintiff’s discovery of his cause of action, while potentially relevant to a 
statute of limitations analysis, does not affect the accrual of his claim for 
determining the nature of the bankruptcy estate. In re Macri, 2007 WL 
1958576, at *2; In re Swift, 129 F.3d 792, 796 (5th Cir. 1997); In re 
Tomaiolo, 205 B.R. 10, 15 (Bankr. D. Mass.1997). Regardless of Lorenz’s 
ignorance of his claim, his interest in this cause of action against Ace 
remains with the bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy trustee, rather than 
Lorenz or Arvada Ace, is the real party in interest under Rule 17(a), and 
only the bankruptcy trustee appointed to Lorenz’s Chapter 7 case is 
entitled to bring these claims.  
Id. at 983. 
 189. See id. at 982. 
 190. See cases cited supra note 151. 
 191. See supra notes 11 and 111. In other words, some of the actual elements of the 
cause of action did not arise until after commencement of the case. This is distinguishable 
2019] EMERGING PROPERTY INTERESTS 129 
a few aberrations could be found, until approximately 2015 there seemed to be little 
disagreement over the fact that claims by and claims against the debtor should be 
assessed in essentially the same manner for purposes of ascertaining, respectively, 
the property of the estate and claimholders entitled to participate in the bankruptcy 
case. 
B. Post-2014 
As discussed earlier, in 2015, the Fifth Circuit issued its opinion in In re 
Cantu,192 expressly rejecting application of the “prepetition relationship” test (which 
applies when evaluating claims against the estate) for purposes of deciding whether 
a debtor’s cause of action belonged to the estate, instead embracing what the court 
referred to as the “accrual approach.”193 However, the Cantu court also qualified its 
holding that, “as a rule, a cause of action accrues when a wrongful act causes some 
legal injury,” by adding, “even if the fact of injury is not discovered until later, and 
even if all resulting damages have not yet occurred.”194 Thus, the muddying of the 
waters began in earnest. 
The picture became considerably murkier when the bankruptcy-court 
decision in In re Wagner issued a short time later.195 The debtor in Wagner had a 
medical procedure performed prior to filing his no-asset Chapter 7 case.196 After the 
discharge was entered and the case closed, Wagner allegedly first discovered the 
possibility that an implant used in the procedure might be defective.197 
Approximately three years later, a settlement program to compensate eligible 
claimants was established, and the United States Trustee moved to reopen the case 
to allow the case trustee to administer the debtor’s settlement proceeds for the 
benefit of the estate’s creditors. 
Predictably, the debtor argued that the proceeds were not property of the 
estate because, under applicable state law, the debtor had not sustained any damage 
“as of the commencement of the case.”198 The trustee countered that the claim giving 
                                                                                                                
from the situation where all of the elements have been satisfied, including a legal injury, but 
the debtor is not yet aware of either the harm or the cause of the harm. See supra text 
accompanying notes 106–07. It is a distinction that should not matter under a Segal-type 
analysis but has been one that may make a difference if the issue is controlled by state-law 
accrual rules. See supra text accompanying note 109. 
 192. Cantu v. Smith, (In re Cantu) 784 F.3d 253 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 193. See supra text accompanying notes 20–23. Recall, this was the view expressly 
and roundly rejected in determining when a claim against the estate arises. See supra notes 
39–40 and accompanying text. 
 194. Cantu, 784 F.3d at 260 (emphasis omitted) (citing Murphy v. Campbell, 964 
S.W.2d 265, 270 (Tex. 1997)). 
 195. See 530 B.R. 695 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2015). 
 196.  Id. at 697. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Of course, often it cannot be known if the damage was suffered as of the 
commencement of the case. This is the problem with the “accrual approach,” at least to the 
extent that it is understood as requiring actual knowledge of the claim. See supra note 121 
and accompanying text. A discovery rule pushes the envelope further, but at the expense of 
foregoing the bankruptcy goal of drawing a clean line between the debtor’s past and the 
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rise to the settlement existed for purposes of § 541(a) prior to the filing date.199 
Initially, the court recognized both the continuing viability of Segal in the Seventh 
Circuit, and that accrual for statute-of-limitations purposes is different than accrual 
for determining property of the estate.200 Nonetheless, the court continued that 
§ 541(a)(1) of the Code “does not indicate how a court should determine whether a 
claim is sufficiently matured as of ‘the commencement of a case’ to constitute ‘an 
interest of the debtor in property.’”201 Then, giving the impression that they were 
truly of equal prevalence and dignity in the case law, the court identified what it 
referred to as the two competing theories that “courts and litigants have applied” for 
resolving the question—namely, the claim accrual and the sufficiently rooted tests—
and stated that it would analyze the issue under each approach.202 
Looking first to state law, the court noted that Wisconsin follows the 
“discovery rule” to determine when a claim accrues.203 Under this rule, a cause of 
action accrues either upon discovery of injury from the wrongful conduct, or when, 
in the exercise of reasonable diligence, the injury should have been discovered.204 
Again, this ties the question of the scope of § 541(a), as it relates to causes of action 
of the debtor, to the determination of when the state statute of limitation commences 
to run.205 Although acknowledging that the discovery rule has its critics,206 the court 
concluded that it was appropriate for situations where, as in this case, there is a gap 
between the harm and the manifestations of symptoms or discovery of the injury 
caused by the harmful conduct.207 
                                                                                                                
future. This, in turn, impinges on the distributional goals of the bankruptcy system as well. 
See supra note 31 and infra notes 255, 258, 266 and accompanying text. Moreover, whatever 
other disagreements may exist over whether Segal remains viable under the Code and how it 
should be applied, the overwhelming majority of cases hold that a prepetition claim becomes 
property of the estate without regard to the debtor’s lack of knowledge or awareness of the 
cause of action. E.g., In re Carroll, 586 B.R. 775, 782 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2018) (“Congress 
does not qualify or limit a debtor’s legal interest based on whether the debtor did or did not 
know that she had a legal interest (a cause of action) or whether state law tolls the running of 
the statute of limitations . . . based on Debtor not being aware of such interests.”) (citing In 
re Ross, 548 B.R. 632, 641 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2016), aff’d, Mendelsohn v. Ross, 251 F. Supp. 
3d 518 (E.D.N.Y. 2017)). 
 199. Wagner, 530 B.R. at 698–99. 
 200. Id. at 699–700; see also sources cited supra note 136. 
 201. Wagner, 530 B.R. at 701. 
 202. See id. 
         203. Id. at 698. 
 204. Id. at 702 (citing Hansen v. A.H. Robins, Inc., 335 N.W.2d 578, 583 (Wis. 
1983)). 
 205. Though sometimes, indeed often, overlooked by courts, it will be recalled that 
“accrual” of a cause of action—when it becomes legally enforceable—may precede actual 
discovery of the same. See supra notes 25–28, 32 and accompanying text. 
 206. Wagner, 530 B.R. at 703 (quoting State Farm Life Ins. v. Swift (In re Swift), 
129 F.3d 792, 796 (5th Cir. 1997)). 
 207. Of course, not all straddle-claims cases involve tort causes of action. See supra 
note 120. However, it is not clear if the court meant to limit its holding. See Wagner, 530 B.R. 
at 705 (adopting the “discovery rule” in the case of “injuries that are potential but not 
certain”). 
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Turning to the Segal analysis, the court reviewed several cases with similar 
facts in which the trustee prevailed because of the finding that most of the critical 
conduct giving rise to the claim occurred in the prebankruptcy past.208 These 
included circumstances, most germane to the court, where the disease resulting from 
exposure to the harmful product was not known or diagnosed until after the 
bankruptcy filing.209 However, the court, expressing sympathy with the opinion in 
Holstein,210 reproved the sufficiently rooted test and concluded that “[i]n the case of 
injuries that are potential but not certain, the ‘discovery rule’ adopted by the state of 
Wisconsin is the fairer and more predictable rule in determining whether a claim is 
property of the estate.”211 
The dial was turned a notch further a year later with the issuance of another 
bankruptcy-court opinion in In re Harber.212 Similar to Wagner, one of the joint 
debtors in Harber, Elizabeth Harber, had allegedly defective medical devices 
implanted in two hip-replacement surgeries prior to the bankruptcy filing.213 The 
difference was that, in this case, the debtor was aware of the potential claim prefiling 
and had even joined a class-action lawsuit against the device manufacturer.214 The 
debtors listed the claim in their schedules but noted that the hip replacements were 
currently operating satisfactorily.215 On motion of the trustee, the court later closed 
the case, subject to reservation of the claim against the device manufacturer.216 
Several months later, Mrs. Harber learned of elevated metals levels in her 
blood and of the need for hip-revision surgery.217 Upon being advised by the 
Harbers’ bankruptcy counsel of a potential settlement with the device manufacturer, 
the trustee moved to reopen the Harbers’ case and sought turnover of any settlement 
                                                                                                                
 208. Wagner, 530 B.R. at 704–05 (citing In re Simmons, 520 B.R. 136 (Bankr. 
M.D. Fla. 2014); In re Webb, 484 B.R. 501 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2012); In re Richards, 249 B.R. 
859 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2000); Casey v. Grasso (In re Riccitelli), 320 B.R. 483 (Bankr. D. 
Mass. 2005)). 
 209. E.g., Richards, 249 B.R. at 861–62. 
 210. Discussed supra text accompanying notes 167–75. Of course, a discovery rule 
arguably goes beyond the holding in Holstein, although these decisions sometimes use the 
terms “accrual” and “discovery” interchangeably, so it’s difficult to line them up with perfect 
clarity. 
 211. Wagner, 530 B.R. at 705; cf. Gaito v. A-C Liab. T., 542 B.R. 155, 171 (E.D. 
Pa. 2015). The 14 cases were heard in the District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania as part of the consolidated asbestos products-liability multidistrict litigation. 
The court also eschewed a sufficiently rooted test. Instead, applying the discovery test under 
maritime law, the court determined that a “cause of action accrues when the injury manifests 
itself,” with the critical inquiry focusing on when the plaintiff had knowledge of the injury 
and its cause. Id. at 164 n.7 (citing Nelson v. A.W. Chesterson Co., 2011 WL 6016990, MDL 
No. 875 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 27, 2011)). 
 212. See Sikirica v. Harber, 553 B.R. 522 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2016). 
         213.  Id. at 525; Wagner, 530 B.R. at 697. 
 214. Harber, 553 B.R. at 526. 
 215. Id. 
         216.  Id. 
         217.  Id. 
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proceeds that the debtors might receive from the manufacturer.218 The debtors 
opposed the trustee’s motion on the basis that Mrs. Harber sustained no injury until 
well after the bankruptcy filing, and therefore, they contended the proceeds did not 
represent property of the estate.219 Specifically, the debtors urged the court to 
employ the “accrual approach” for deciding if the proceeds were estate property, 
with accrual occurring when a cause of action arises under applicable state law.220 
The trustee countered that the court should use the Segal test, focusing, of course, 
on whether the claim was sufficiently rooted in the debtors’ bankruptcy past.221 Like 
the court in Wagner, the Harber court suggested that it would analyze the facts under 
each approach.222 
Beginning with what it termed “the state law accrual approach,” the court 
observed that, under Pennsylvania law, a cause of action accrues when the holder 
has “the right to institute suit.”223 In the case of a cause of action involving latent 
injury, that means when the claimholder discovers or should have discovered that 
he or she had been injured.224 Thus, unlike other decisions that distinguished 
between accrual and discovery,225 the Harber court conflated the two.226 
The trustee had entreated that the court should follow the Third Circuit’s 
holding in In re Grossman’s,227 wherein the court parted company with its earlier 
decision on the issue and adopted the “prepetition relationship” approach for 
determining the existence of a claim under § 101(a)(5).228 The Harber court 
declined, citing the Fifth Circuit’s rejection of that approach in Cantu in the context 
of the determination of the property of the estate.229 In justifying its decision, the 
                                                                                                                
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. at 526–27. 
 220. Id. at 528. Note this rule would seem to be narrower than the rule in Wagner, 
which focused on discovery. See supra notes 203–207 and accompanying text, although the 
Harber court later seemed to meld the two together. See infra note 226 and accompanying 
text. 
 221. Harber, 553 B.R. at 528. 
 222.  Id. Wagner, 520 B.R. at 701. 
 223. Harber, 553 B.R. at 528 (observing that, in the context of a personal-injury 
suit, this included actual damage suffered as a result of the defendant’s breach of a legal duty). 
 224. Id. at 529 (quoting Wilson v. el-Daief, 964 A.2d 354, 361–62 (Pa. 2008)). 
Thus, the court seemed to ignore the distinction recognized in other cases between the 
incurring of a legal injury and discovery of the same. See, e.g., supra note 25. Of course, that 
distinction is itself a fuzzy one because identifying when a legal injury is incurred can be a 
tricky proposition. See infra note 275. 
 225. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 25 and 37. 
 226. See also infra notes 314–15 and accompanying text for an example of another 
decision committing essentially the same faux pas. 
 227. Harber, 553 B.R. at 527 (citing Jeld-Wen v. Van Brunt (In re Grossman’s, 
Inc.), 607 F.3d 114, 125 (3d Cir. 2010) (en banc)). 
 228. In re Grossman’s, Inc., 607 F.3d at 121, 125; see supra text accompanying 
note 40–41; see also In re Ruitenberg, 745 F.3d 647, 652 (3d Cir. 2014) (noting that the focus 
is on when the claims exists, not when it accrues). 
 229. Harber, 553 B.R. at 529–30 (quoting Cantu v. Schmidt (In re Cantu), 784 F.3d 
253, 259 (5th Cir. 2015)). 
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court noted that the legislative history with respect to the breadth of “property of the 
estate,” while fulsome, was not quite as expansive as the expressions in the 
legislative history relating to the scope of the definition of “claim.”230 Based on that 
razor-thin reed, the court returned to the claim-accrual approach dictated by state 
law for resolution of the issue.231 Because Mrs. Harber had exhibited no symptoms 
or damages relating to the implants as of the date of the debtors’ bankruptcy filing, 
the court thus concluded that her claim did not constitute estate property.232 
Next, the court purported to consider the sufficiently rooted test, 
acknowledging the continued vitality of Segal under the Code.233 Rather than 
actually doing so, however, the court observed that different decisions had employed 
different approaches to the application of Segal, ranging at the extremes from whole-
hearted adoption to outright rejection.234 In between, the court identified what it 
termed a “blended approach,” marrying a strict Segal analysis with elements of the 
state-law accrual approach.235 In support of its decision to adopt this blended 
approach, the court stated that “complete adherence to Segal, without any 
consideration of the state accrual test, is inconsistent with Butner and the plain 
language of section 541(a)(1).”236 
How this marriage of two very dissimilar approaches occurs, and what it 
looks like, was left unclear by the Harber court, to say the least. The court’s 
description of the blended approach, in fact, consisted solely of a citation to language 
from a Massachusetts bankruptcy-court decision237 to the effect that considerations 
of the extent to which the claim is rooted in the prebankruptcy past should be 
tempered by considerations bearing on the debtor’s ability to make a fresh start.238 
                                                                                                                
 230. Id. at 530. The court also concluded, without much by way of explanation, that 
there was “no proof” that the Third Circuit intended its holding of when a claim arises against 
the estate to apply to circumstances involving the question of when claims by the estate arise. 
Id. For an equally unsatisfying explanation for the distinction between the treatment of claims 
against the estate versus claims by the estate, see supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text. 
 231.  See Harber, 553 B.R. at 530.   
 232. Id. at 531. 
 233. Id. (“There can be little doubt that Segal retains vitality after the passage of 
the Bankruptcy Code in 1977.”). 
 234. Id. at 531–32. 
 235. Id. at 532. 
 236. Id. In point of fact, it is inconsistent neither with the full holding of the Court 
in Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 40, 55 (1979), infra text accompanying note 252, nor the 
scopic nature of the definition  of “property of the estate” in § 541(a)(1), supra notes 43–44). 
 237. Harber, 553 B.R. at 532 (citing Vasey v. Grasso (In re Riccitelli), 320 B.R. 
483 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005)). 
 238. Id. But see infra note 339 (suggesting that this portion of the holding in Segal 
was not carried forward into the Code). The court in Harber also rejected the trustee’s 
argument that the debtors should be judicially estopped from asserting ownership of the cause 
of action because they had listed it as an “asset” on the schedules files in conjunction with 
their petition. 553 B.R. at 533–35. 
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While that particular view finds support in the language of the Segal opinion itself,239 
exactly what it has to do with state-law accrual principles is, putting it mildly, a 
puzzle. As a practical matter, the approach that the Harber decision actually appears 
to be endorsing is a de facto broad, open-ended “balancing of the equities” exercise, 
which is in fact what the court proceeded to do in reaching its conclusion that Mrs. 
Harber’s claim, though with undeniable and significant roots in the past, was not 
property of the bankruptcy estate.240 
The “discovery rule,” whether seen as distinct from or synonymous with 
an accrual approach, has attracted somewhat of a following in a handful of recent 
cases,241 but at the same time, other contemporary decisions continue to adhere to 
the majority approach to straddle claims.242 Moreover, the factual permutations that 
                                                                                                                
 239. See Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 379 (1966). On the other hand, as noted, 
it is debatable whether that aspect of the Segal holding carried forward into the Code. See 
infra note 339. 
 240. Harber, 553 B.R. at 532–33. The court based this conclusion on the fact that 
Mrs. Harber did not learn of her condition until after the discharge had been granted in the 
debtors’ case. Id. This, of course, does not mean that she had not been harmed by the defective 
device. See supra note 224 and infra note 275. However, the court cited the absence of any 
proof that the implant failure developed slowly over time; it was due to a gradual deterioration 
rather than an acute event. Harber, 553 B.R. at 533. Thus, the trustee failed, according to the 
court, to meet his burden of proving that the cause of action was sufficiently rooted in Mrs. 
Harber’s prepetition past. Id. The court also rejected the trustee’s arguments that the debtors 
should be judicially estopped from contesting inclusion of the claim in the estate because they 
had failed to object when the trustee excepted it from abandonment on the closing of the case. 
Id. at 533–35. 
 241. Williamson v. Peters, No. 17-2356-CM, 2018 WL 780554, at *2 (D. Kan. Feb. 
7, 2018) (noting that property interests that exist at filing but have yet to fully materialize 
have been treated as estate property (citing Segal), but then proceeding to analyze whether a 
cause of action represents property of the estate under the state-law accrual test set forth in In 
re Smith, 293 B.R. 786, 788 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2003) (discussed supra notes 153–160 and 
accompanying text)); Mendelsohn v. Ross, 251 F. Supp. 3d 518 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (recognizing 
applicability of Segal, but concluding that because the most critical element that created the 
debtor’s property interest—the discovery that there was a defect with the medical device—
did not occur until well after the petition date, this “interest was not ‘substantially rooted’” in 
her prebankruptcy past for purposes of § 541”), aff’d, 251 F. Supp. 3d 518 (E.D.N.Y. 2017). 
 242. See, e.g., Lawrence. v. Shelbyville Road Shoppes, LLC (In re Shelbyville 
Road Shoppes, LLC) 775 F.3d 789, 795–96 (6th Cir. 2015) (applying Segal); In re 
Sheikhzadeh, No. 14-14219-BFK, 2018 WL 3197752 (Bankr. E.D. Va. June 26, 2018) 
(applying the sufficiently rooted test to determine that legal malpractice claims were property 
of the estate); In re Carroll, 586 B.R. 775, 784–88 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2018) (distinguishing 
Mendelson’s, cited supra note 198, application of Segal); Callahan v. Roanoke Cty, VA (In 
re Townside Constr., Inc.), 582 B.R. 407, 414–16 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2018) (discussed infra 
notes 251–58 and accompanying text); In re Whittick, 547 B.R. 628, 635 (Bankr. D.N.J. 
2016) (applying Segal to find that a prepetition loan approval gave the debtor an interest in 
funds that became property of the estate under §§ 541(a)(1) and (a)(6) when the funds were 
received postpetition); In re Kooi, 547 B.R. 244, 248 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2016) (noting that 
in applying § 541(a)(1), “most courts analyze whether the asset is ‘sufficiently rooted in the 
pre-bankruptcy past’ of the debtor”); In re Segura, No. 07-31907, 2016 WL 829830, at *2 
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio Mar. 2, 2016) (“Since Segal, courts, including the Sixth Circuit Court of 
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have arisen are more varied and more nuanced than the cases rejecting (or limiting) 
Segal have openly identified or labeled,243 leaving us with a lack of clear and 
effective guidelines.244 What is clear is that the principal point of disparity among 
these standards is the degree to which resolution of the matter should be resolved 
under state law as opposed to in accordance with unique federal bankruptcy concepts 
of equality, equity, and fresh start. Therefore, it is to the broader question of the 
proper role of state-law principles in resolving bankruptcy-specific issues that 
attention is turned next as the foundation for recommending Segal’s sufficiently 
rooted test as the proper standard for dealing with straddle claims in a bankruptcy 
case. 
IV. THE INTERACTION OF STATE AND FEDERAL AUTHORITY IN 
BANKRUPTCY CASES 
As earlier pointed out,245 the holding in Butner regarding property interests 
in bankruptcy simply reflects the reality that Congress has not elected to enact a 
comprehensive federal commercial law. Thus, of necessity, the determination of 
which interests represent property rights that may then become part of a bankruptcy 
estate is left to state law, except, according to Butner, where some federal interest 
compels a different right.246 This oft-cited holding—that state law governs parties’ 
relative rights in bankruptcy, absent a countervailing federal bankruptcy interest—
is actually nothing more than a particularized application of the Supreme Court’s 
                                                                                                                
Appeals, analyze whether an asset received by a debtor postpetition is ‘sufficiently rooted in 
the pre-bankruptcy past’ of the debtor such that it should be regarded as property of the 
bankruptcy estate.”); cf. Murray v. 3M Co., 297 F. Supp. 3d 869, 872 (E.D. Ark., 2018) 
(describing Segal’s sufficiently rooted test as the governing standard in the Eighth Circuit, 
but also suggesting that property of the estate is tied to state-law accrual rules). 
 243. See supra text accompanying notes 96–101. 
 244. While courts have used labels such as an “accrual approach,” or a “discovery 
rule” or a “blended approach” almost interchangeably, they have not been consistent in terms 
of whether the defining event is the occurrence of the last element of the cause or whether it 
is the discovery of the same. See Harber, 553 B.R. at 529 (quoting Wilson v. el-Daief, 964 
A.2d 354, 361–62 (Pa. 2008)); discussed supra note 224. That is to say, it is unclear whether 
the operative event is the legal right to enforce the claim or the time that the state statute of 
limitations commences to run. Moreover, depending on fortuity of state law, discovery could 
be an actual element of the cause. Compounding the confusion, as seen in the Harber opinion 
(Sikirica v. Harber, 553 B.R. 522 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2016)), some courts have suggested 
accrual is tantamount to establishing that the claim is sufficiently rooted in the prebankruptcy 
past, ignoring the fact that accrual is simply not the determining factor under a Segal-type 
analysis. See, e.g., Mueller v. Hall (In re Parker), 368 B.R. 86, *7 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2007) 
(unpublished) (noting that the question is not whether the debtor’s claim accrued in terms of 
whether the last element of the cause of action occurred prior to the filing of bankruptcy, but 
whether the debtor’s claim is sufficiently rooted in the debtor’s prebankruptcy past). 
 245. See supra text accompanying notes 55–64. 
 246. United States v. Butner, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979). 
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famous statement in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins that “[t]here is no federal general 
common law.”247 
Bankruptcy, however, presents unique challenges for application of the 
Erie doctrine, as the source of jurisdiction in bankruptcy cases, of course, is federal 
and grounded in policy considerations that do not exist in routine diversity-of-
citizenship actions.248 Nonetheless, ever since the first long-standing federal 
bankruptcy law was enacted in 1898, state law has continued to play a vital 
interstitial role in defining the commercial rights, interests, and entitlements of 
participants in a bankruptcy case.249 Thus, the tension between the two—and, in 
particular, when federal policy trumps state-law rules and consequences—is 
pervasive and acute.250 
Nearly 65 years ago, Professor Hill articulated some of the ramifications of 
the Erie doctrine in the context of the bankruptcy system, noting: 
[T]he federal courts are not to shrink from applying a “federal 
common law” in “those areas of judicial decision within which the 
policy of the law is so dominated by the sweep of federal statutes 
that legal relations which they affect must be deemed governed by 
federal law having its sources in those statutes, rather than by local 
law.” But always the limits of the authority of the federal courts to 
                                                                                                                
 247. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). The policies underlying the Erie principle are to avoid 
having the outcome of litigation differ when the suit is brought in federal court and the forum-
shopping such a result would produce. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467–68 (1965). 
Of course, the statement that there is no federal common law is itself a bit of an over 
generalization. There has, however, developed special federal common law in a number of 
areas of activity, such as banking, labor relations, environmental protection, pension plans, 
and of course bankruptcy, where there is a strong federal interest. See generally Official 
Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of the Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Columbia Gas 
Sys. Inc. (In re Columbia Gas Sys.), 997 F.2d 1039, 1054–64 (3d Cir. 1993) (discussing when 
federal common law will control the adjudication of an issue). See also Allan Erbsen, Erie’s 
Four Functions: Reframing Choice of Law Rules in Federal Court, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
579, 618–27 (2013). 
 248.        U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4. 
 249. See Lawrence Ponoroff, Constitutional Limitations on State-Enacted 
Bankruptcy Exemption Legislation and the Long Overdue Case for Uniformity, 88 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 353, 355 (2014) (discussing the “vital interstitial role [of state law] in defining 
the commercial rights, interests, and entitlements of participants in the bankruptcy case”); 1 
GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 403 (1965) (citing the 1898 
Act as the “most familiar example” of how state law operates in the background of federal 
legislation to fill the inevitable gaps in the fabric of federal statutory law). 
 250. For more detailed discussion of the diverging views over the extent to which 
private state-law rights should be regarded as inviolate in bankruptcy, see Ponoroff, supra 
note 17, at 1220 n.8. See also Adam J. Levitin, Toward a Federal Common Law of 
Bankruptcy: Judicial Lawmaking in a Statutory Regime, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 29, 71–77 
(2006) (making a compelling case for the common law of bankruptcy as involving a uniquely 
federal interest). 
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make substantive law are the limits of the federal policy being 
executed.251 
The full holding in Butner, then, simply established a baseline or default 
rule regarding the nature or character of property interests in bankruptcy. That is to 
say, once the bankruptcy case is initiated, state law will usually provide the source 
of the right in question, but it does not provide the ground on which federal 
jurisdiction is founded. And therefore, it is the policies of the federal bankruptcy law 
that determine how the right is treated in the administration of the bankruptcy case—
whether consonant with state law or otherwise.252 
For these reasons, under a proper reading of Butner, substantive state law 
will ordinarily determine what, if any, legal claims against third parties the debtor 
possesses as of the commencement of the case. However, Butner does not mean all 
attributes of state law, including when a cause of action accrues or a period of 
limitations begins to run, must be imported and applied in answering important 
federal questions, such as the scope of property of the estate. The same, of course, 
is true, and widely acknowledged, with respect to defining claims against the estate 
and when they arise.253 In a similar fashion, state law defines the existence and 
nature of such claims, but whether the claims are allowed (and in what amount) or 
disallowed is a question of federal law, just as the question of how claims are 
allocated between secured and unsecured portions is determined by the Bankruptcy 
Code, not state law.254 
                                                                                                                
 251. Alfred Hill, The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1013, 1033 
(1953), cited in Ralph Brubaker, 32 No. 4 Bankruptcy Law Letter 1 (Pt. I) (2012); see also 
Vern Countryman, The Use of State Law in Bankruptcy Cases (Part 1), 47 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
407, 408–09 (1972) (“Also in the category of judicial errors, in my judgment, are those 
decisions which treat Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins as requiring the application of state law 
in bankruptcy cases.” (footnote omitted)); Donald R. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values: A 
Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 717, 766 (1991) (describing bankruptcy as 
“provid[ing] a forum in which competing and various interests and values accompanying 
financial distress may be expressed and sometimes recognized”). 
 252. See Ponoroff, supra note 17 at 1261–63 (indicating that questions concerning 
how a claim, once identified under state law, will be treated in bankruptcy are controlled 
exclusively by federal law and therefore must be resolved based on the policies implicated 
upon the filing of a bankruptcy case; policies that simply do not attain under state law). The 
general awkwardness of the marriage between state and federal law in bankruptcy is 
exacerbated by the fact that, at their core, the two systems imagine a very different sort of 
problem to which each is responding. See also Juliet M. Moringiello, (Mis)use of State Law 
in Bankruptcy: The Hanging Paragraph Story, 2012 WISC. L. REV. 963, 987–88 (2012) 
(pointing out as well that, implicitly, the Court held that state law generally controlled 
property rights upon entry into bankruptcy, but not necessarily what happened to them in 
bankruptcy or how they looked upon exit); Ponoroff, supra note 249, at 356 (same); In re 
TransAmerica Nat. Gas Corp., 79 B.R. 663, 667 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1987) (refusing to enforce 
a liquidated-damages provision in a contract because the effect of doing so would be to 
enforce a rejected contract). 
 253. See supra text accompanying notes 37–41. 
 254. See Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 240 
(1946) (“In determining what claims are allowable and how a debtor’s assets shall be 
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In sum, Congress has permitted state law to function within the fabric of 
federal bankruptcy law in order to identify the prebankruptcy rights of the parties 
involved in a bankruptcy case; it was not, however, constitutionally compelled to do 
so.255 No one has more forcefully made this point than Professor Juliet Moringiello, 
who has observed that “courts have so overused Butner that its limited scope has 
been buried . . . . State law does not prevail in bankruptcy, rather, it is displaced 
unless Congress has permitted it to govern for specific bankruptcy purposes.”256 
Whether particular facts establish a substantive cause of action will usually 
be resolved under applicable nonbankruptcy, most often state, law.257 However, the 
question of when the cause of action “arises” for purposes of assigning it (or not) to 
a debtor’s bankruptcy estate is quite a different matter. The jurisprudence controlling 
when a cause of action arises under state law is, of necessity, nonuniform and, of 
course, developed wholly oblivious to the special considerations that pertain in a 
bankruptcy case and that have no analog under state law.258 Moreover, states use 
comparable language and concepts, such as “legal injury,” with subtle shadings of 
different meaning.259 Thus, to ascertain whether any particular straddle claim 
belongs to the estate by reference to the jumble of state-law accrual norms means 
the outcome will inevitably be the product of the serendipity of location and local 
politics, rather than based on reasoned policy objectives.260 Indeed, it is much like 
                                                                                                                
distributed, a bankruptcy court does not apply the law of the state where it sits. Erie R. Co. v. 
Tompkins . . . has no such implication . . . . [B]ankruptcy courts must administer and enforce 
the Bankruptcy Act as interpreted by this Court in accordance with authority granted by 
Congress to determine how and what claims shall be allowed under equitable principles.”); 
see also TABB, supra note 49, §12.12, at 1240 (pointing out that questions of how secured 
claims are allocated are governed by § 506(a)). 
 255. In re Pruitt, 401 B.R. 546, 553–54 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2009). 
 256. See Moringiello, supra note 252, at 988 (noting that state law determines a 
creditor’s priority rights, but not its “remedy rights,” as to do so would upset bankruptcy 
collectivist policies). Professor Moringiello expanded on the overly broad interpretation that 
has been given to Butner in the case law in When Does Some Federal Interest Require a 
Different Result?: An Essay on the Use and Misuse of Butner v. United States, 2015 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 657, 665 (2015) (noting how the opinion in Butner has without justification 
“morphed” into a rule seen as limiting the ability to modify property rights in bankruptcy). 
         257.  See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text. 
 258. Bankruptcy, in other words, is distinct from state law in that it is concerned 
with a collectivized debt-collection process in which considerations of equality of distribution 
among, and maximization of value for, creditors (concerns to which state law is largely 
oblivious) all factor into a comprehensive and intricate scheme for wrapping up the debtor’s 
prepetition financial life and, ideally, providing the debtor with a path to financial viability in 
the future. See supra note 252. 
 259. Compare Cantu v. Schmidt (In re Cantu), 784 F.3d 253, 260 (5th Cir. 2015) 
(distinguishing between the occurrence of a legal injury and discovery of the same), with In 
re Smith, 293 B.R. 786, 789 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2003) (requiring that the showing of substantial 
injury entails that the injury was “reasonably ascertainable” as of the commencement of the 
case). 
 260. This result flies in the face of the Court’s rationale for the Erie rule in the first 
place. See supra notes 251–54. It also hardly promotes the constitutional objective of giving 
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expecting to find an able short-order cook by posting a job description identifying 
the key skills of an experienced auto mechanic. The state-law rules governing 
accrual, ripeness, tolling, etc. were, as they necessarily had to be, formed without 
taking into account considerations of fresh start, value maximization, and creditor 
equality in mind (or even anywhere near the neighborhood!). 
The accrual approach, in whatever form, for determining whether debtor 
claims are property of the estate ignores the central fact that the entire bankruptcy 
process is predicated on drawing a sharp line on the temporal map, with claims 
arising on one side of that line being treated in one manner and claims that arise on 
the other side of that line being treated in quite a different manner.261 In an effort to 
promote fresh start and bring as full of an accounting as possible of the debtor’s 
prepetition life, as has been seen, the courts eventually came universally to reject a 
state-law accrual approach to the definition of “claim” for purposes of § 101(5).262 
The invectives that were hurled at the Third Circuit’s Frenville decision,263 
effectively leading to the displacement of that opinion,264 apply with no less force to 
the discovery or accrual tests for assessing ownership of debtor causes of action. 
Exclusive reliance on a state-law accrual theory ignores the intent of Congress to 
define “property of the estate” broadly and assure equitable treatment of creditors. 
It is, therefore, no surprise that, in interests of creditor equality and equity, the 
majority of courts have rejected, and continue to reject, state-law accrual rules for 
determining property of the estate.265 Nevertheless, the recent decisional law 
exhibiting an increased willingness to abandon or diminish the precedential value of 
Segal in favor of state-law procedural niceties is disturbing. 
Comparable treatment of similarly situated creditors is no less fundamental 
a tenet of bankruptcy law than fresh start.266 Though usually thought of in terms of 
treating all prepetition creditors on equal terms, it also means that there should be 
no unfair discrimination between pre- and postpetition creditors. Defining “property 
of the estate” more narrowly than the definition of claims for purposes of § 101(5) 
operates to favor postpetition creditors at the expense of their prepetition 
                                                                                                                
Congress the authority to enact a “uniform law” on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the 
United States. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 261. See supra note 4 and text accompanying note 46; see also Epstein et al., supra 
note 53, at 18 (identifying the cleavage effect of the filing of a bankruptcy petition as an 
integral part of the fundamental bankruptcy policy behind the discharge). 
 262. See supra notes 37–41 and accompanying text. 
 263. See Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co. (In re M. Frenville Co.), 744 F.2d 
332, 337 (3d Cir. 1984). 
 264. See supra text accompanying note 41. 
 265. See sources cited supra notes 77–80, 142, 242. 
 266. See Howard Delivery Serv. v. Zurich Am. Ins., 547 U.S. 651, 667 (2006) 
(identifying the deep roots of the equality-of-distribution objective in the Bankruptcy Code); 
Begier v. I.R.S., 496 U.S. 53, 58 (1990) (“Equality of distribution among creditors is a central 
policy of the Bankruptcy Code.”); H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 178 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6138 (“the prime bankruptcy policy of equality of distribution among 
creditors”). 
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counterparts.267 It stands to reason, therefore, that an important federal interest is 
compromised under the accrual or discovery theories for deciding whether straddle 
claims are property of the estate. Accordingly, despite the unremitting pull and tug 
between state and federal law in the bankruptcy process that occurs more generally, 
in this context, Butner, by its own terms, is pushed off stage. 
V. APPLICATION OF SEGAL AND THE MAJORITY RULE TO 
STRADDLE CLAIMS 
In Harber, the bankruptcy court attempted to fashion a third alternative to 
the state-law accrual and sufficiently rooted tests; namely, the “blended” 
approach.268 While not suggesting that it was intended by the court as such, the 
blended approach is little more than a rhetorical flimflam.269 In fact, there really are 
only two alternatives to dealing with straddle claims; either assign them to the 
debtor’s pre- or postpetition life based on idiosyncratic state-law rules or do so under 
the uniform federal standard established by the Supreme Court in Segal. The two 
“blend” about as well as fire and gasoline. For the reasons noted immediately 
above,270 bankruptcy-related considerations dictate that the latter should control. 
To begin with, Segal’s continued viability under the Code is beyond any 
serious question,271 and its application is not displaced by the Butner principle.272 
Additionally, the Segal standard, when properly applied, is consistent with the 
consensus understanding of when a claim against the estate arises and the important 
policy objectives that drive that understanding.273 Moreover, it eliminates the 
confusing and unresolved issues under the state-law accrual approach of whether the 
operative event is the discovery of the claim or when the legal injury (or such other 
final element of the cause) actually occurred, without regard to knowledge.274 
                                                                                                                
 267. It might be argued that treating claims by the debtor less expansively than 
claims against the debtor is not so much an inter-creditor issue, but rather about advancing 
fresh-start policy. However, that view would not simply be naïve; it would ignore the fact that 
contemporary bankruptcy law remains very much a creditors’ remedy. Professor Thomas 
Jackson recognized this fact over 25 years ago with his comment that “[b]ankruptcy, at first 
glance, may be thought of as a procedure geared principally toward relieving an overburdened 
debtor from ‘oppressive’ debt. Yet . . . most of the bankruptcy process is in fact concerned 
with creditor-distribution questions.” Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy 
Entitlements, and the Creditors’ Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 857 (1982). The availability of 
prepetition assets to satisfy the claims of postpetition creditors would simply be an unearned 
boon for those creditors in contravention of the distributional norms intended to control the 
bankruptcy scheme. See supra note 54. 
 268. See supra text accompanying notes 235–36. 
 269. The key element is accrual, rendering Segal considerations not just secondary 
but also superfluous. See also infra text accompanying notes 307 and 318–25 for a later 
decision engaging in a similar charade. 
 270. See supra text accompanying notes 245–54. 
 271. See supra notes 77, 79–84. 
 272. Supra text accompanying notes 245–54. 
 273. Supra notes 34–41 and accompanying text. 
 274. Some courts, it will be recalled, require actual discovery of the harm, e.g., In 
re Wagner, 530 B.R. 695 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2015), while others only require that the legal 
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Finally, trying to determine temporally the onset of a legal injury is itself 
problematic and unnecessarily vague. This is due to the fact that locating the precise 
point in time when an initially latent injury occurs is often an impossible exercise, 
particularly in product cases, as the disease (or its existence) tends to be a 
progressive affair; there is not a single moment in time before which it does not exist 
and after which it does.275 
By contrast, the sufficiently rooted approach to straddle claims advances 
core bankruptcy policies and eliminates the impreciseness associated with a state 
accrual or discovery approach. It is not, however, without some interpretational 
issues of its own. Two are perhaps most pressing: the standard to be used in assessing 
on which side of the filing date the roots are deepest, and under what circumstances 
might a property interest that is more closely connected to prefiling events 
nonetheless be excluded from the estate and remain with the debtor. 
A. Application of the Sufficiently Rooted Test 
“Sufficient” is an inherently indeterminate term. It is clearly less than 
“substantial” and arguably can even be less than 50%. In terms of deciding when a 
claim is “sufficiently rooted” in the debtor’s past so as to constitute estate property, 
most cases involving latent tort injury present no particular problem, or no more 
problem than those posed by application of the prepetition-relationship test for 
assigning claims against the estate.276 If the exposure or other conduct putting the 
debtor in contact with the dangerous or defective product all occurred prior to filing, 
the sufficiently rooted test is satisfied.277 It is noteworthy that in both Wagner and 
Harber, where the courts indicated an intent to analyze the issue under both the 
accrual or discovery test and Segal,278 neither of the reported opinions actually states 
a conclusion of how the case would be decided under the traditional “rooted in the 
prebankruptcy past” test. Rather, they simply declare that the discovery rule or 
                                                                                                                
injury have been sustained, e.g., Cantu v. Schmidt, (In re Cantu), 784 F.3d 253 (5th Cir. 
2015). See also supra notes 106–11 and accompanying text and note 244. 
 275. This is particularly true with respect to asbestos and other product-related 
injury, which may be latent at the time of initial exposure and through the progression of the 
disease until the disease eventually manifests itself. Thus, the only verifiable point in time is 
exposure. See J.H. France Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 626 A.2d 502, 506 (Pa. 1993) 
(sustaining the lower court’s determination that “bodily injury,” for purposes of liability 
insurance coverage encompasses the progression of the disease from “the period of exposure 
until, ultimately, the manifestation of recognizable incapacitation constitutes the final 
‘injury’”). Courts that place the burden of establishing the time of injury on the trustee, see 
supra note 240, must inevitably conclude that the cause of action is not property of the estate 
if the disease is not discovered until postfiling, regardless of other facts. This seems to defy 
the letter and spirit of a sufficiently rooted test. 
 276. Supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text. 
 277. Technically, if all of the elements of the cause have been satisfied or occurred 
prior to filing, Segal is satisfied without much further analysis, because the claim resides 
entirely in the past. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. Under a discovery approach, 
of course, that conclusion does not follow. 
 278. 530 B.R. 695, 701 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2015); Sikirica v. Harber, 553 B.R. 522, 
528 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2016). 
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“blended approach,” respectively, represent fairer and more predictable rules for 
determining whether a claim is property of the estate.279 Implicitly, this might be 
seen as an admission of sorts that, in both cases, the trustee would have prevailed 
under a traditional Segal-type analysis. 
While the product-liability cases may be straightforward for the most part, 
there are other situations where either the use/exposure continues after filing, or 
nonproduct cases where the assignment of the debtor’s cause of action to the past or 
the future is less than clear.280 In these circumstances, adoption of a simple 
preponderance approach to satisfaction of the sufficiently rooted test would seem 
both most serviceable and most appropriate. To begin with, as the applicable 
standard of proof in most civil actions, it is well-known and understood.281 In 
operation, the question for inclusion in or exclusion from § 541(a)(1) would be 
whether the events, circumstances, and activities that form the basis of the debtor’s 
cause of action occurred predominantly (more than half) prior to or after the 
commencement of the case. 
An example of such a case is the decision in Field v. Transcontinental Ins. 
Co.,282 discussed earlier,283 where the bankruptcy court dealt with a situation 
involving a debtor’s bad-faith claim against an insurer for failure to defend and cover 
liability arising out of an accident that occurred five months prior to the debtor’s 
bankruptcy filing.284 It will be recalled that the insurer thus argued that the claim did 
not accrue until it denied the debtor’s request for indemnification.285 Even though it 
is unlikely that the debtor had a prepetition cause of action under state law, the court 
concluded that this fact had no bearing on the resolution of the question under 
Segal’s sufficiently rooted test.286 Instead, once the accident occurred, the debtor 
had a contingent right to coverage that was alone enough to assign the claim to the 
debtor’s past.287 Of course, the court did not use the language of “preponderance” in 
                                                                                                                
 279. See supra notes 211, 236 and accompanying text. 
 280. See cases cited supra note 148. 
 281. See generally RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 432 (2d ed. 
1977) (offering an economic-efficiency justification for the preponderance test); Miller v. 
Minister of Pensions [1947] 2 All ER 372 (K.B.D.) (defining “preponderance” as greater than 
50%); John Leubsdorf, The Surprising History of the Preponderance Standard of Civil Proof, 
67 FLA. L. REV. 1569 (2015). 
 282. 219 B.R. 115 (E.D. Va. 1998), aff’d, 173 F.3d 424 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 283. Supra text accompanying notes 143–46. 
 284. The insurer did, however, receive notice of the claim two months prior to 
filing. Field, 219 B.R. at 118. 
 285. The defendant-insurer argued that until it actually denied coverage to the 
debtor, “there was no antagonistic assertion of rights between the parties, and thus no actual 
controversy.” Id. at 119. 
 286. Id. (“This is so because the bankrupt’s estate includes not only claims that had 
accrued and were ripe at the time the petition was filed, but also those claims that accrued 
postpetition, but that are ‘sufficiently rooted in the pre-bankruptcy past.’”). 
 287. Id. As an alternative basis for its holding, the court noted the fact that the policy 
at issue, and hence the rights flowing from it, existed prior to the bankruptcy petition. Id. In 
support of this alternative holding, the court cited two cases involving when a claim arises for 
purposes of § 101(5). Id. at 20. For another textbook example of the predominance approach, 
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its opinion, but it is beyond cavil that such an approach would have yielded the same 
outcome—and perhaps more readily so in that the major components of the claim 
coincided with the principal event triggering the right to coverage. 
A preponderance standard is also consistent with the bankruptcy court’s 
analysis in In re Riccitelli,288 a case finding that the prebankruptcy roots of the claim 
in question were too shallow to support the trustee’s argument for inclusion.289 The 
circumstances in Riccitelli involved the prefiling failure by the debtor’s attorney to 
file a homestead exemption in the debtor’s favor, as well as his failure to ascertain 
that one had not already been filed by or on behalf of the debtor.290 The trustee urged 
that the resulting cause of action for malpractice based on these omissions occurred 
before the filing of the bankruptcy petition.291 The court disagreed, opining that the 
acts and omissions complained of did not cause harm—make it all but inevitable—
until the debtor filed the bankruptcy petition; thus, albeit only momentarily, placing 
the negligence outside the debtor’s prebankruptcy past.292 Further, the court noted 
the exemption right forgone by the lawyer’s negligence—and that would have 
placed the homestead beyond the reach of the debtor’s creditors—was one that the 
Bankruptcy Code gave the debtor as against the estate, an entity that did not exist 
until the bankruptcy case was commenced.293 Thus, the conclusion was that the 
claim’s prepetition roots were overwhelmed by significant postpetition aspects of 
the claim.294 In other words, a preponderance of the facts and circumstances forming 
the essential elements of the claim occurred either as of the moment of filing or 
thereafter. 
One might certainly question the Riccitelli court’s application of the facts 
to the legal standard established by Segal. For example, in In re J.E. Marion, Inc.295 
the court held that a legal malpractice claim based on bankruptcy counsel’s conduct 
both prior to and after the commencement of the case represented property of the 
estate.296 The point, however, is that the court in Riccitelli recognized that its 
                                                                                                                
see In re Bolton, 584 B.R. 44 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2018). See also In re Tomaiolo, 205 B.R. 10, 
14 (Bankr. D. Mass 1997), aff’d sub nom. Tomaiolo v. Rodolakis (In re Tomaiolo), No. 90-
40350, 2002 WL 226133 (D. Mass. Feb. 6, 2002) (holding a malpractice claim to be part of 
the estate where most, but not all, of the allegations of negligence occurred prepetition). 
 288. 320 B.R. 483 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005). 
         289.  Id. at 490–91. 
 290. Id. at 485–86. 
 291.  Id. at 486–87. 
 292. Id. at 491. See also Lawrence v. Commonwealth of Ky. Transp. Cabinet (In re 
Shelbyville Road Shoppes, LLC), 775 F.3d 789, 795 (6th Cir. 2015) (concluding that a good-
faith deposit made by the debtor’s assignor on a proposed real-estate purchase did not 
constitute property of the estate under Segal’s sufficiently rooted test). 
 293. Riccitelli, 320 B.R. at 492 (“Treating this claim as an asset of the estate would 
be tantamount to giving the remedy to the party that derived a windfall from counsel’s 
negligence instead of to the party that was harmed by it, taking the benefit of the exemption 
from the Debtor a second time.”). 
 294. Id.; see also O’Dowd v. Truegar (In re O’Dowd), 233 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2000), 
discussed supra text accompanying notes 89–105. 
 295. 199 B.R. 635 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1996). 
 296. Id. at 637; see also supra note 85. 
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outcome must be guided by the Supreme Court’s holding in Segal.297 The fact that 
the court’s actual execution of the sufficiently rooted test—as opposed to its 
articulation of the applicable standard—is open to some question does not draw 
away from the principal value of the case as it relates to the advantages of a 
preponderance approach for applying Segal.298 
A more principled and faithful application of the sufficiently rooted 
standard can be found in the recent bankruptcy court’s decision in In re Townside 
Construction, Inc.299 In a nutshell, the former Chapter 7 debtor corporations, which 
shared a common owner, filed suit in state court against a lender that had initiated 
postpetition foreclosure proceedings against the debtors’ properties, alleging 
collusion with the foreclosure trustee and various other irregularities in connection 
with the sales.300 The bankruptcy cases were reopened for purposes of determining, 
on a joint motion, whether the causes of action, which had not been disclosed in the 
debtors’ schedules or in their § 341 hearings,301 were property of the various 
estates.302 After initially affirming the continued viability of Segal under the Code 
and under circuit precedent,303 the court turned to the application of § 541(a) and 
Segal to the stipulated facts of the case. Pointing to multiple indications that the 
debtors began having suspicions about the bank well before their bankruptcy cases 
were filed,304 the court concluded that the debtors’ causes of action “are ‘sufficiently 
rooted’ in the Debtors’ pre-bankruptcy pasts with Pinnacle [the bank] to fall within 
the Segal test, and further that the alleged causes of action sufficiently flow from the 
Debtors’ prepetition assets such as to fall within the scope of § 541(a)(1) and (7).”305 
                                                                                                                
 297. Riccitelli, 320 B.R. at 489–90. 
 298. Contrast the standard applied in Riccitelli with In re de Hertogh, 412 B.R. 24, 
30 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2009) (applying Connecticut law to conclude that a legal malpractice 
claim based on failure to secure a homestead exemption for the debtor was not property of 
the estate because it did not accrue prior to the commencement of the case). 
 299. Callahan v. Roanoke Co., VA (In re Townside Constr. Co.), 582 B.R. 407 
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 2018). 
 300. There were actually two separate lawsuits: the first, which was removed to the 
bankruptcy court, came before the court for approval of a proposed settlement. Id. at 411. The 
second dealt with different properties and alleged the collusion with the foreclosure trustee 
and related entities, one of which was the high bidder in one of the sales. Id. at 412. A copy 
of the complaint in the second case was filed with the bankruptcy court three days prior to the 
hearing on the motion in the first case. Id. 
 301. Id. at 410–11, 415. 
 302. The trustee maintained that the causes of action arising from the foreclosure 
were estate property and, further, the suits had improperly proceeded without his 
authorization and participation. Id. at 412. The debtors countered that the causes of action 
alleged were not property of the estates and that they were free to bring the litigation without 
the Trustee's involvement or participation. Id. at 412–13. 
 303. Id. at 414–15. 
 304. Id. (noting the debtors’ concerns the lender was communicating with other 
banks about their loans). 
 305. One of the debtors’ cases was an asset case, the other not. This meant, in the 
former instance, unsecured, prepetition creditors’ deficiencies would be reduced by damages 
recovered from the lender, and in the latter, such recovery might allow distributions to be 
made. Id. at 6. 
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Because, under state law, the causes of action could not conceivably have arisen 
until the actual foreclosure settings, the analysis in Townside is antithetical to the 
approach taken in decisions such as Harber.306 
Although a preponderance test can be squared with the overwhelming 
number of cases applying a traditional Segal-like analysis, a recent bankruptcy-court 
decision307 has raised the specter of an alternative method for defining “sufficiently 
rooted” that merits discussion. Like Holstein and Wagner, the case involved a hip-
replacement device implanted in one of the joint debtors (Mr. Bolton) two years 
prior to the commencement of the case.308 Three years after the case was closed, Mr. 
Bolton was diagnosed as requiring a hip “revision” of his replacement.309A year 
later, the debtors filed a products case against the manufacturer of the components 
used in the replacement and, four years later, received a settlement offer of 
approximately $235,000.310 Thereupon, the trustee in the debtors’ bankruptcy case 
moved to reopen for purposes of administering the products-liability claim and any 
recovery therefrom as assets of the estate.311 
In deciding if the claim arising from the hip-replacement surgery was estate 
property, the court found that the products-liability cause of action did not “accrue” 
under Idaho state-law rules until “objective medical evidence” supported the 
existence of Mr. Bolton’s injury and resulting damages.312 Rejecting the trustee’s 
argument for an earlier date,313 the court found that no such injury was experienced 
or detected prior to the filing of the debtors’ case.314 Thus, on this basis, the court 
concluded that Mr. Bolton’s cause of action could not properly be regarded as 
property of the estate.315 
The court continued, however, that this determination did not necessarily 
dispose of the issue due to the trustee’s alternative argument that the cause of action 
was nonetheless property of the estate because it was sufficiently rooted in the 
debtors’ prebankruptcy past.316 After conceding the continued viability of Segal 
under the Code,317 the court turned to the matter of identifying the appropriate 
standard for unspooling the meaning of “sufficiently rooted.”318 Inexplicably, the 
court proceeded to review a number of cases following the state-law accrual 
                                                                                                                
 306. See supra text accompanying notes 212–36. 
 307. In re Bolton, 584 B.R. 44 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2018). 
 308. Id. at 47. 
 309. Id. at 48. 
 310. Id.  
 311. Id. 
 312. Id. at 51–52. 
 313. Id. 
 314. Id. at 52. Presumably, by specifically using the phrase “objectively 
ascertainable” the court was adopting an approach, even though it purported to be addressing 
state law relative to “accrual” of a cause of action. Id. 
        315.  Id. 
        316.  Id. 
        317.         Id. 
318. Id. at 53. 
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approach rather than a traditional approach to Segal.319 Based on that authority, 
which was not germane in any way to the question posed, the court then held that in 
order for property acquired postpetition to be “sufficiently rooted in the past” it must 
arise from some prepetition right or entitlement, and that this could not be said to be 
the case until Mr. Bolton’s injury was “objectively ascertainable.”320 
Bolton is suspect on a number of grounds. First, the court treated the 
question as a matter of first impression in the circuit, ignoring relevant authority 
from the Ninth Circuit.321 Second, unlike cases where the right could not be said to 
exist until after the bankruptcy filing,322 a cause of action based on exposure to 
dangerous and defective products was obviously a known and well-established state-
law right. Third, the court ignored testimony that Mr. Bolton had complained to his 
physician about hip pain prior to the debtors’ bankruptcy filing.323 Finally, and 
perhaps most relevant for present purposes, the court, without seeming to recognize 
as much, conflated accrual of a cause under state law with Segal’s sufficiently rooted 
test by defining the latter in relation to the identical standard governing the former.324 
In effect, the Bolton court gave Segal absolutely no independent field of operation 
and, instead, came to the non sequitur that only a claim that had accrued under state 
law could be categorized as “sufficiently rooted” in the debtor’s prebankruptcy 
past.325 For all intents and purposes, the court’s purported test for applying the 
                                                                                                                
        319.        These included Sikirica v. Harber (In re Harber), 553 B.R. 522 (Bankr. W.D. 
Pa. 2016), discussed supra text accompanying notes 212–348, and In re Wagner, 530 B.R. 
695 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2015), discussed supra text accompanying notes 195–211. 
 320. Bolton, 584 B.R. at 55. As is apparent, the court ended up—somewhat 
astonishingly—in the same place in connection with its sufficiently rooted analysis as it had 
under the state-law accrual case; namely, that the cause could not belong to the prebankruptcy 
past if there was no discovery of the harm until postfiling. Id. Also, the court likened the 
situation to the facts underlying the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Sliney v. Battley (In re 
Schmitz), 270 F.2d 1254 (9th Cir. 2001), discussed supra note 119, rather than the facts of 
Rau v. Ryerson (In re Ryerson), 739 F.3d 1423, 1426 (9th Cir. 1984), discussed supra text 
accompanying notes 79–84, when just the opposite would seem appropriate. Bolton, 584 B.R. 
at 54–55. In Schmitz, as in the crop-disaster cases, supra Section II.C, there was no cognizable 
legal claim until the filing of the bankruptcy case. Schmitz, 270 F.3d at 1258. In Bolton, there 
could hardly be a doubt that Idaho law provided a cause for individuals harmed by 
implantation of defective products. Bolton, 584 B.R. at 48. (state-law causes of action asserted 
by the debtors in their products liability suit included strict liability, negligence, breach of 
implied warranty of merchantability, and breach of express warranty).  
 321. Bolton, 584 B.R. at 53 (“As near as the Court can determine, there is no 
published Ninth Circuit case law addressing this precise issue.”). Insofar as the “precise” 
issue—a faulty medical device—was concerned, that may have been true, it could hardly be 
said that the Ninth Circuit had not opined on the standard to be applied in determining whether 
after-acquired property represented estate property—as the court’s own citation to Ryerson 
and Schmitz made abundantly clear. Id.; see also Cusano v. Klein, 264 F.3d 936, 947 (9th Cir. 
2001). 
 322. See supra note 178. 
 323. Bolton, 584 B.R. at 48. 
 324.  Id. at 53. 
 325. Id. at 55 (“Debtors’ cause of action against the hip device manufacturer would 
not arise until that device resulted in an injury to Mr. Bolton that was objectively 
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sufficiently rooted standard was, in substance, a wholesale abnegation of that 
standard. Thus, at bottom, the opinion should be regarded as an aberration that in no 
way undermines the wisdom of employing a case-by-case analysis focused on when 
the majority (a preponderance) of the relevant facts, circumstances, and events 
underlying the cause occurred, or even an argument for a lesser standard,326 although 
the latter is not the position advanced in the present treatment. 
B. Limitations on the Sufficiently Rooted Test 
Another potential quandary associated with the Segal analysis is whether it 
applies without reservation any time a property interest is tied to both pre- and 
postbankruptcy events, or if there are situations where countervailing policy 
considerations might warrant a relaxing of its application. Interestingly, a 
comparable question surrounds the scope of the prepetition-relationship approach 
for defining claims against the estate, although in that context the answer is dictated 
by the minimum constitutionally required notice to claimholders. The problem 
surfaces in the case of unknown future claimants; i.e., individuals who had 
prepetition contact with the debtor (or exposure to its product) but have not yet 
manifested indications, or discovered the existence, of any injury as of the time of 
the bankruptcy filing.327 
The definition of the term “claim” under § 101(5) cannot be divorced from 
fundamental principles of due process.328 The importance, however, of closure and 
                                                                                                                
ascertainable. On bankruptcy day, it remained a ‘nebulous possibility’ that the device would 
cause him injury.”). This is the same circular reasoning that the court employed in Harber. 
See supra note 226 and accompanying text. 
 326. As noted at the beginning of this Section, by definition, “sufficient” implies a 
lower standard than “substantial” and might plausibly include less than 50%. See supra 
Section V.A. 
 327. Cf. In re UNR Indus., Inc., 71 B.R. 467, 469 n.1 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987) 
(distinguishing between “putative claimants,” as including all persons that were exposed to 
asbestos but had not been diagnosed as having an asbestos-related disease, from “future 
claimants,” referring to persons who had been exposed to the debtor’s asbestos, had not yet 
gotten sick, but who, in the future, would be diagnosed as having an asbestos-related disease 
as a result of that exposure). 
 328. If potential future tort claimants have not filed claims because they are 
unaware of their injuries, they might challenge the effectiveness of any purported notice of 
the claims bar date, and ergo, the discharge. See generally, Jeld-Wen v. Van Brunt (In re 
Grossman’s, Inc.), 607 F.3d 114 (3d Cir. 2010) (opining that any application of the 
prepetition-relationship test cannot be divorced from “fundamental principles of due 
process”). It is concern over satisfaction of the Due Process Clause that has caused most 
courts to reject the “conduct” test, see supra note 41, for determining when a claim arises 
under § 101(5). See, e.g., United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 944 F.2d 997, 
1004–05 (2d Cir. 1991); In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 162 B.R. 619, 625–26 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 
1994) (noting that the conduct test likely defines “claim” too broadly), aff’d, 168 B.R. 434 
(S.D. Fla. 1994), aff’d, Epstein v. Off. Unsecured Creditors Comm., 58 F.3d 1573 (11th Cir. 
1995). One commentator opined that “[t]he ‘pre-petition relationship test’ ameliorates the 
problem often attributed to the ‘conduct test’—that a bankruptcy proceeding cannot identify 
and afford due process to claimants.” Barbara J. Houser, Chapter 11 as a Mass Tort Solution, 
31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 451, 465 (1998). 
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finality in bankruptcy—assuring as complete a settlement as possible—has caused 
courts to be creative in assuring that the demands of due process are satisfied while 
still capturing virtually all claims falling under the prepetition-relationship test. In 
In re Placid Oil Co.,329 for example, a reorganized debtor reopened its previously 
closed case in order to determine whether certain postconfirmation asbestos-related 
claims asserted by a former employee had been discharged by the earlier 
confirmation of the debtor’s plan.330 Following the bankruptcy court’s grant of 
summary judgment to the debtor,331 the former employee appealed. The Eleventh 
Circuit affirmed, ruling that in the case of an “unknown creditor” a debtor’s 
publication of notice of the bankruptcy proceeding in a newspaper of national 
circulation satisfied due-process requirements.332 
Another device used to permit the restructuring of a business to proceed 
while still avoiding the potential due-process problems implicated by discharging 
unknown claims has been the appointment of a future-claims representative, charged 
with the responsibility to assure protection of the rights of such claimants in 
connection with a comprehensive bankruptcy settlement.333 The most innovative 
approach yet in the context of asbestos-related claims was adopted by the 
bankruptcy court as part of the Manville plan of reorganization.334 In that case, the 
court oversaw the confirmation of a consensual plan that included the establishment 
of a trust out of which all asbestos health-related claims, known and unknown, were 
to be paid.335 
The health trust created in Manville became the basis for Congress’s effort 
to deal with the problem of asbestos claims on a national basis, which it did by 
enacting § 524(g) of the Code as part of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994.336 
Section 524(g) authorizes courts “to enjoin entities from taking legal action for the 
purpose of . . . collecting, recovering, or receiving payment or recovery with respect 
                                                                                                                
 329. Williams v. Placid Oil Co., 753 F.3d 151 (5th Cir. 2014). 
         330.  Id. at 153. 
 331. Id. (both the bankruptcy court and the district court concluded that the former 
employee’s argument that the debtor’s notice was insufficient on due-process grounds). 
 332. Id. at 163–64 (rejecting the argument that the bar-date notice must inform 
unknown claimants of the nature of potential claims); see also Ralph R. Mabey & Jamie A. 
Gavrin, Constitutional Limitations on the Discharge of Future Claims in Bankruptcy, 44 S.C. 
L. REV. 745 (1993) (concluding that discharge of future claims is constitutionally 
permissible). 
 333. See In re Amatex Corp., 755 F. 2d 1034, 1042–43 (3d Cir. 1985); Piper, 162 
B.R. at 619. 
 334. See In re Matter of Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 625–27 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff’d, 78 B.R. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff’d sub nom. Kane v. Johns-Manville 
Corp., 843 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1988). 
 335. Id. at 621; see also Laura B. Bartell, Due Process for the Unknown Future 
Claim in Bankruptcy—Is This Notice Really Necessary?, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 339 (2004) 
(arguing that actual notice to a future-claims representative is adequate notice to unknown 
claimants). 
 336. See H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 40 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3340, 3348–49. 
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to any [asbestos-related] claim or demand” through the establishment of a trust from 
which asbestos-related claims and demands are paid.337 
The limits on the inclusion of straddle claims as property of the estate are 
obviously not set by the strictures of the Due Process Clause. Rather, to the extent 
they exist, they proceed from the demands of the fresh-start principle itself. The 
Court in Segal noted that the term “property” for purposes of § 70a(5) of the 1898 
Act was to be broadly construed so as “to secure for creditors everything of value 
the bankrupt may possess in alienable or leviable form when he files his petition.”338 
However, the Court continued that the “limitations on the term do grow out of other 
purposes of the Act; one purpose which is highly prominent . . . is to leave the 
bankrupt [now “debtor”] free after the date of his petition to accumulate new wealth 
in the future.”339 After balancing the extent to which the claim in Segal was rooted 
in the prebankruptcy past against how the claim impacted the debtor’s ability to 
make a fresh start, the Court determined that the tax-refund claim at issue should 
come into the bankruptcy estate because it was “so little entangled with the 
bankrupts’ ability to make an unencumbered fresh start . . . .”340 
A debtor’s claim with respect to injuries suffered because of prepetition 
contact with or exposure to a dangerous or harmful product is generally quite 
different from the type of postpetition claim that some courts have sometimes kept 
out of the estate as having been acquired by the debtor principally in his or her 
postpetition life.341 Likewise, a claim that arises out of activities and events 
                                                                                                                
 337. The statutory prerequisites imposed by § 524(g) in establishing a health trust 
in return for a channeling injunction—i.e., limiting such claimants’ recourse to the trust— 
against future claims are detailed in In re Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 234 n.45 
(3d Cir. 2004). 
 338. Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 379 (1966). 
 339. Id. at 379. There is, however, serious doubt as to whether this aspect of the 
holding survived enactment of the Code. See Rau v. Ryerson (In re Ryerson), 739 F.2d 1423, 
1426 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding that the Code eliminates the Segal limitation concerning that 
the asset not be entangled in the debtor’s ability to make a fresh start) (citing S. Rep. No. 989, 
95th Cong., 2d Sess. at 82 (1978), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787 at 5868); In re Richard, 
249 B.R. 859, 861 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2000) (“The 1978 Bankruptcy Code follows Segal to 
the extent that it includes after acquired property ‘sufficiently rooted in the pre-bankruptcy 
past’ but eliminates the requirement that it not be entangled in the debtor’s ability to make a 
fresh start.”) (cited by Tyler v. D.H. Cap. Mgmt., Inc., 736 F.3d 455, 462 (6th Cir. 2013)); 
Hoffman v. Bruneau (In re Bruneau, 148 B.R. 4, 6 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1992) (citing In re 
Ryerson, 739 F.2d 1423). The argument is essentially that the fresh start is assured through 
the Code’s exemption scheme in § 522, and the exclusion of earnings attributable to 
postpetition services from the after-acquired property are captured by § 541(a)(6). 
 340. Segal, 382 U.S. at 380 (distinguishing future wages or a subsequent bequest); 
see also In re Tomaiolo, 205 B.R. 10, 14 (Bankr. D. Mass 1997), aff’d sub nom. Tomaiolo v. 
Rodolakis (In re Tomaiolo), 2002 WL 226133 (D. Mass. Feb. 6, 2002) (disagreeing expressly 
with the decision in Swift v. Seidler (In re Swift), 198 B.R. 927 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1996), 
which had examined the issue only in terms of state-law-claims accrual principles)); see 
authorities cited supra notes 147–48. 
 341. E.g., Casey v. Grasso (In re Riccitelli), 320 B.R. 483, 491 (Bankr. D. Mass. 
2005), discussed supra text accompanying notes 288–94. 
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occurring wholly on the prebankruptcy side of the line, even if not coming due until 
after filing, do not much compromise the fresh start that the bankruptcy process is 
intended to afford the debtor342—a fresh start, it will be recalled, purchased from 
prepetition creditors by liquidation and payout of all of the debtor’s interests in 
property extant as of filing.343 Thus, a distinction is easily drawn between wages 
attributable to pre- versus postpetition services, regardless of when payable.344 The 
same is true for claims predominantly residing in the past. Their allocation to 
prepetition creditors by virtue of inclusion in the estate does not impinge to any 
significant degree on the debtor’s ability to begin anew, from the date of filing, with 
a clean slate. Likewise, in the grand balancing of debtor protection with creditor 
rights that defines the bankruptcy process,345 assignment of such claims to the 
bankruptcy estate represents less than full, but at least acceptable, compensation of 
a sort for the fresh start from prepetition claims that the debtor acquires through the 
proceeding.346 
However, in some circumstances reopening and postpetition turnover of 
assets acquired pursuant to a claim predominantly residing in the debtor’s 
prebankruptcy past might not produce a material benefit for prepetition creditors. 
Theoretically, this could be due to the fact that prepetition creditors were paid in full 
so that there is nothing to gain by reopening the case. However, that scenario—a 
full-pay Chapter 7 case—is rare, to say the least.347 More realistically, even though 
general creditors were not fully paid by distributions earlier in the case, reopening 
might be uncalled for if neither such creditors nor their successors exist any longer, 
or the cost of identifying and locating them would, along with the other costs of 
administration, consume substantially all of the newly recovered assets.348 In those 
                                                                                                                
 342. E.g., Field v. Transcontinental Ins. Co., 219 B.R. 115, 119 (E.D.Va.1998), 
aff’d, 173 F.3d 424 (4th Cir. 1999), discussed supra text accompanying notes 143–46. The 
fresh start is an aim of the system; it is not an entitlement to be achieved to the exclusion of 
all other considerations. That is to say, the object is to create the conditions that will hopefully 
permit the debtor to return to economic health, not to guaranty the same. 
 343. See generally Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, Debtors Who 
Convert Their Assets on the Eve of Bankruptcy: Villains or Victims of the Fresh Start?, 70 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 235 (1995) (“A central feature of American consumer bankruptcy law is the 
‘fresh start’ policy, which, through the dual mechanisms of discharge and exemption, affords 
debtors a certain degree of economic viability in exchange for the surrender of present assets 
at filing.”); Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. 
REV. 336, 361 (1993) (noting that one of the “normative function the bankruptcy system 
serves is to constrain externalization of business losses to parties not dealing with the debtor”). 
See also supra note 31. 
 344. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6); Segal, 382 U.S. at 379–80 (explaining why future 
wages of the debtor are not included in the property of the estate). 
 345. See supra notes 52 and 267. 
 346. See supra text accompanying notes 53–54. 
 347. In fact, well over 90% of Chapter 7 cases are no-asset cases, and, of the 
remaining, most of the debtors did not expect to have assets that might be distributed to 
creditors when they filed. See Dalié Jiménez, The Distribution of Assets in Consumer Chapter 
7 Bankruptcy Cases, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 795, 796 (2009). 
 348. Particularly with respect to noncorporate or institutional creditors, one can 
reasonably assume that the greater the passage of time between closing of the case and receipt 
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situations, leaving the property interest in question with the debtor obviously causes 
no harm; indeed, it actually enhances the fresh-start objective. More importantly, it 
also saves unnecessary administrative expense to reach a result that would, in the 
end, operate to the benefit neither of the debtor nor his or her creditors.349 It is 
certainly conceivable that when the cause is first discovered—and thus becomes ripe 
under state law—years or even decades after the bankruptcy case is closed, these 
circumstances could attain. In that scenario, if the debtor’s standing is challenged by 
the defendant to avoid having to pay the obligation, abandonment of the claim 
should be sought from and readily ordered by the bankruptcy court.350 This will, as 
noted, likely advance the debtor’s fresh start without extracting an undue price or 
sacrifice from the debtor’s prepetition creditors. 
Alternatively, and more challenging, is the question of when a right to 
payment that can be traced both to pre- and postpetition events might also be 
excluded from the estate under this standard, even if, under a preponderance 
approach, it belongs to the past and there are as-yet-unsatisfied general creditors 
extant. One scenario might be where the postfiling use, and any related harm, make 
it so intertwined with the debtor’s abilities to preserve his or her postbankruptcy 
economic health and viability that finding otherwise would be considered as 
interfering intolerably with the debtor’s fresh start.351 In effect, just as a claim 
against the estate might be spared from the discharge because of principles of 
                                                                                                                
of the assets in question, the greater the likelihood that it will prove, if not impossible, at least 
infeasible to locate such nonprofessional creditors in order to provide proper notice of the 
deadline for filing a claim. See In re Lowery, 398 B.R. 512, 516 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.2008) 
(finding the potential benefit to creditors insufficient to reopen when there were four creditors 
with aggregate claims of $13,249.90 and 10–14 years had passed from the time the claims 
was incurred). Of course, the amount of assets at stake and the debtor’s good faith or lack 
thereof will bear on the analysis. See, e.g., In re Arana, 456 B.R. 161, 175 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 
2011) (finding the concern of the difficulty of locating creditors to be outweighed by the 
potential benefit to 30 creditors with a total of $112,862.83 in claims). 
 349. Because the expenses of administration are paid ahead of unsecured claims, 
see 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(2) and 726(a)(1), there is nothing to be gained if the cost of reopening 
the case to administer the new asset will consume all or substantially all such assets. 
 350. This is due to the effect that if the claim properly belongs to the estate, the 
debtor will technically lack standing to pursue on his or her own behalf. E.g., Segal v. Segal 
(In re Segal), 579 B.R. 734, 740 (E.D. Pa. 2016); Runaj v. Wells Fargo Bank, 667 F. Supp. 
2d 1199, 1206 (S.D. Cal. 2009) (A “debtor may not prosecute a cause of action belonging to 
the bankruptcy estate absent a showing her claims were exempt from the bankruptcy estate 
or abandoned by the bankruptcy trustee”); cf. Ah Quin v. Cty. of Kauai Dep’t of Transp., 733 
F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir. 2013) (upon reopening of debtor’s case, the trustee abandoned his 
interest in the debtor’s pending discrimination claim in order to allow the action to be pursued 
by the debtor). 
 351. As noted earlier, it is not clear that this aspect of the Segal holding survived 
enactment of the Code. See supra note 339. However, the entire bankruptcy system is an 
exercise in balancing competing policies, supra note 222 and text accompanying note 289, so 
the inquiry is never precluded. That said, in my view, this “intolerable interference” should 
never be satisfied by the fact that the debtor could really use the money, as such a standard 
would almost invariably result in debtor retention of the assets in question. 
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fundamental fairness,352 so too might a claim by the debtor deemed to predominantly 
reside in the prebankruptcy past nonetheless avoid capture by the estate in order to 
serve competing bankruptcy policies. 
Assume, for example, the property interest at issue involves liability for an 
injury (unknown at the commencement of the case) that since the closing of the case 
has impaired the debtor’s ability to earn a livelihood and provide for his or her 
family. Those facts alone should not warrant altering the conclusion reached under 
the sufficiently rooted test. Again, it is the opportunity for a fresh start the 
bankruptcy system provides, not a guaranty that this will lead to financial well-
being. If, however, we add to the mix that the postpetition payment received by the 
debtor on account of such claim has been innocently committed in a fashion that 
cannot be unwound without causing irrevocable economic harm—i.e., a material 
worsening of the debtor’s financial situation beyond simple loss of the asset—then 
the circumstances might call for a balancing of such harm against the prejudice 
suffered by prepetition creditors by not recovering the asset. Even this presumes, 
however, that the claim at issue was not sufficiently matured at filing as to belong 
entirely to the debtor’s prebankruptcy past; i.e., not all elements of a prepetition 
cause occurred or were satisfied prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition.353 If 
that condition is satisfied—there is a connection to postpetition as well as prepetition 
events—then considerations of fresh start might justify allowing the cause or its 
value to remain with the debtor in spite of its significant prebankruptcy roots. 
Although bankruptcy courts are, by dint of what they do day-in-and-day-
out, quite good at this sort of interest-balancing approach, the reality is that 
circumstances such as these are unlikely to be encountered except in the exceedingly 
rare case. This is appropriate in the sense that just as the exclusion of a prepetition 
claim from the discharge undermines the core bankruptcy aim of bringing a full and 
final settlement to the debtor’s prepetition life,354 so too should creditor-equality 
principles be abandoned only sparingly. Stated another way, prepetition creditors 
should only seldom be required to sacrifice their end of the bankruptcy bargain by 
foregoing their ratable share of a postpetition-discovered asset that is critically (but 
not entirely) rooted in the debtor’s prebankruptcy past. The point to be made, 
however, is that no rule is so inflexible and unabiding that it is privileged from ever 
allowing exception, and language in the Segal decision355 can be drawn upon to 
allow for the possibility, on proper facts, that the sufficiently rooted test might be 
tempered based on compelling equitable considerations.356 
                                                                                                                
 352. Supra notes 328–32, 262 and accompanying text. 
 353. Such a claim, belonging entirely to the prebankruptcy past, is, in a sense, not 
really a straddle claim at all. See supra text accompanying notes 107–09; e.g., In re Carroll, 
586 B.R. 775 (Bankr. E.D. Ca. 2018), discussed supra notes 109 and 179. 
 354. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 329–35. 
 355. See supra notes 339–41 and accompanying text. 
 356. Historically, it has been quite frequently said that bankruptcy courts are 
“courts of equity.” See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304 (1939) (“[F]or many 
purposes ‘courts of bankruptcy are essentially courts of equity, and their proceedings 
inherently proceedings in equity.’”) (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 240 
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CONCLUSION 
Modern bankruptcy law reflects a careful balancing of debtor protection 
and creditor rights.357 Setting the normative fulcrum is neither easy nor ever 
permanent.358 It also entails an ambition to accomplish policy goals that have no 
counterparts under state law.359 Two of the most pivotal of these policies are 
providing the broadest relief possible by treating the filing of a petition as cleaving 
a wide chasm between the debtor’s pre- and postbankruptcy lives,360 and assuring 
equitable treatment of creditor claims.361 When a creditor is deemed under one test 
to have a claim against the estate, but then is deprived of its share of an asset that 
upon application of the same test would be property of the estate, both of these key 
principles are done violence. 
In implementing these policy objectives in the context of property interests 
with a tie to both pre- and postpetition activities and events, the Supreme Court 
adopted a test that is not only simple to articulate and apply, but also sensitive to the 
unique balancing of debtor and creditor interests that animate the federal bankruptcy 
law. It is a test that achieves equity inter se by following the same broad outline as 
has been adopted with respect to claims against the estate that have not accrued as 
of the commencement of the case.362 Finally, it is a test that has been clearly carried 
forward under the Code363 and not altered by other pronouncements (often 
                                                                                                                
(1934)). A principle source of this power has been found to reside in Code § 105(a), which in 
pertinent part states: “The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary 
or appropriate to carry out the provisions of [the Code].” 11 U.S.C. § 105(a). In recent years, 
however, that assertion has been called into some question. But see Randolph J. Haines, The 
Conservative Assault on Federal Equity, 88 AM. BANKR. L.J. 451, 455 n. 23 (2014) (quibbling 
with some of the more recent arguments questioning whether bankruptcy courts are truly 
courts of equity, referring to these arguments as “formulistic,” and observing that the 
jurisdictional amendments in 1978 and 1984 were intended to broaden, not narrow, 
bankruptcy courts’ jurisdiction). See generally Alan M. Ahart, The Limited Scope of Implied 
Powers of a Bankruptcy Judge: A Statutory Court of Bankruptcy, Not a Court of Equity, 79 
AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 32 (2005) (“[A] bankruptcy court should not be referred to as a court of 
equity. Supreme Court and other decisions rendered under the Bankruptcy Code stating that 
the bankruptcy court possesses all equitable authority or powers are incorrect—at least where 
a bankruptcy judge is the presiding judicial officer.”). 
 357. Epstein et al., supra note 53, at 21 (noting that, in addition to fresh start, 
bankruptcy seeks “to get the most value out of the debtor’s assets for the benefit of all of the 
debtor’s prepetition creditors”); see also supra notes 51 and 222 and accompanying text. 
 358. See Lawrence Ponoroff, Bankruptcy Preferences: Recalcitrant Passengers 
Aboard the Flight from Creditor Equality, 90 AM. BANKR. L.J. 329, 330 (2016) (pointing out 
the balancing that goes on in the bankruptcy arena between the competing interests between 
debtors and creditors, and among creditors, is a normative one and not a “feat of mechanical 
engineering”). 
 359. Id. at 383. 
 360. See supra note 4. 
 361. See supra notes 31, 54, 266, 356. 
 362. Supra text accompanying notes 35–42. 
 363. See sources cited supra note 77. 
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misunderstood) of the Supreme Court in relation to the role of state law in 
bankruptcy cases.364 
The effort in recent cases to disaggregate the question of when claims 
against the estate arise from the question of when claims by the debtor become 
property of the estate is ill-considered and has introduced needless uncertainty and 
complexity into the law. Use of the state-law accrual or discovery test (or both), 
formulated in each case with other, nonbankrupty considerations in mind is 
inappropriate precisely because of its inattention to the careful balance struck by the 
Code between ensuring the debtor’s fresh start and securing maximum value for the 
creditors who otherwise suffer the cost of that right to a new financial life. 
By contrast, employment of Segal’s sufficiently rooted test, governed by a 
preponderance standard, ensures that the equilibrium between debtor and creditors, 
as well as among creditors, is properly struck in the overwhelming number of cases 
where the issue arises. It also eliminates the inevitable confusion involved with 
pressing murkily defined state-law concepts into service to address core bankruptcy 
questions. Therefore, the inexplicable drift in the decisional law away from the 
sufficiently rooted test and toward a greater reliance on state law in assessing 
whether straddle claims fall under property of the estate365 needs to be stemmed, and 
the question should be addressed from the relevant perspective of what approach to 
interpreting § 541(a)(1) in the context of straddle claims will most effectively 
implement the multifaceted and not-always-complementary goals of the federal 
bankruptcy law. 
 
                                                                                                                
 364. See supra notes 56–63, 247, 249 and accompanying text. 
 365. Uncomfortably, the trends toward greater deference to state law in addressing 
key bankruptcy issues have not been limited to issues surrounding the scope of § 541(a)(1). 
See, e.g., Ponoroff, supra note 17 (addressing the same issue in the context of when to 
recharacterize debt as equity). 
